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A "BLUNT WITHDRAWAL"? BARS ON CITIZEN SUITS FOR
TOXIC SITE CLEANUP
Margot J. Pollans*
Throughout the history of federal statutory environmental law, citizen suits have
played a key role in enforcement. Through statutory interpretation, however, courts
have narrowed the circumstances under which citizens can sue. This Article explores
one such restraint: Courts have severely limited citizen suits under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA ")by reading very broadly a jurisdiction-stripping
provision of RCRA's companion statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA "). This Article argues that courts have
read that provision too broadly, not only violating traditionalprinciplesfor resolving
inter-statutoryconflict but also undermining the purposes of both statutes by eliminating
what could be an essential mechanismfor combating delay during toxic site cleanups.
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INTRODUCTION

Toxic site cleanup is slow. Painfully slow. Numerous factors contribute
to delay: inadequate funding for cleanup; lack of political will for cleanup;
insufficient information about the scope of contamination; infighting among
responsible polluters; corruption; turnover in government enforcement offices;
and polluter recalcitrance, to name just a few. The average cleanup takes
twelve years and some take much longer.'
Theoretically, citizen suits are a tool to accelerate cleanup. Citizens can
play a critical role in identifying toxic harms and in putting pressure on the
relevant government agency, polluter, or both, to take action. Imagine the following scenario. Firm A, a coal tar processing plant, operated on the riverbank
of a major city for a hundred years. Throughout its operation, Firm A gradually
filled in wetlands adjacent to its property with material containing coal tar and
other gas manufacturing wastes containing high levels of toxic heavy metals
such as benzene and arsenic as well as other carcinogens. The federal government has conducted a study investigating the scope of contamination and identifying possible remedies and has attempted to negotiate with Firm A to
develop a cleanup plan. Negotiations, however, have broken down. While
Firm A does not contest its liability for the cleanup, it does dispute the scope of
cleanup required. Ten years go by, and the site sits not only unremediated but
open to general public access. Unaware of the scope of contamination, local
community members use the site as a boat launch and for subsistence fishing.
Toxic pollutants continue to leach into the groundwater and into the river.2
In this instance, where the federal government has chosen not to pursue
enforcement after voluntary negotiations have broken down, a citizen suit
against the polluter could force the polluter to remove the contaminated fill or
otherwise clean up the site. Specifically, a citizen could file suit under a provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") allowing suits
to abate "imminent and substantial endangerment" caused by improper handling of hazardous wastes.3
Most federal courts, however, would refuse to hear such a suit. Why?
Because the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Lia'CONG. BUDGET OFFicE, ANALYZING THE DURATION OF CLEANUP AT SrrES ON SuPERFuND's NATIONAL PRIoRITIEs LIST 7 (MAR. 1994).

The facts of this hypothetical are drawn loosely from Anacostia Riverkeeper v. Washington Gas
Light Co., No. I 1-1453, 2012 WL 4336243 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2012).
3 RCRA 7002(a)(1)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2012).
2
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bility Act ("CERCLA"), the Superfund Act, has a provision stripping federal
courts of jurisdiction over suits "challenging]" ongoing federal CERCLA
remediation. And federal courts have almost uniformly read this provision CERCLA section 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) - broadly to bar suits related to
any site where any CERCLA remediation is ongoing.
Litigation itself, of course, can delay cleanup, and the purpose of section
113(h) is to ensure that cleanup can proceed efficiently, without interruption. It
prevents polluters from stalling cleanup by challenging its scope. But courts
have nearly universally applied section 113(h) without regard to whether the
litigation in question would cause or remedy delay. Reasoning that CERCLA's
plain language requires this outcome, courts have expressed their regret that
their hands are tied and that RCRA suits cannot be salvaged.
But CERCLA's meaning is not so plain; indeed, this Article argues that the
statute actually has more than one permissible reading: one, which courts have
adopted, that creates a conflict with RCRA, and others which harmonize the
two statutes. Why, given this fact, have courts so consistently sacrificed citizen
suits? For the most part, courts have not expressly considered this choice, instead opting for the former option by rote invocation of plain meaning or reliance on precedent. Two policy justifications appear to underlie these decisions:
first, deference to the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") (or whatever
state level agency is overseeing cleanup); second, administrability of CERCLA.
This Article argues that these policy rationales are limited and serve primarily
to ease the workload of courts. Harmonizing the statutes would better serve the
purpose of both statutes: to protect the public health and the environment from
toxic harms.
Part I provides background on RCRA and CERCLA, the two statutes
forming a comprehensive scheme governing prevention and cleanup of toxic
pollution. It then explores both statutes' citizen suit provisions. Both statutes
allow for citizen enforcement, and both establish significant limitations on
when suits may be brought. Specifically, both statutes prohibit suits while certain CERCLA actions are ongoing. Citizen suits in this context, as in most
environmental statutes, are a gap-filling measure, designed to stand in where
the relevant government agency lacks the will or the resources to pursue enforcement. Part I concludes with a brief discussion of the case law interpreting
CERCLA section 113(h). The provision is broadly worded and has been given
an expansive reading. Courts apply the provision regardless of the plaintiff and
regardless of the underlying cause of action - in other words, section 113(h)
strips federal courts of jurisdiction over claims arising under various other federal laws including the National Historic Preservation Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act in addition to
RCRA and CERCLA.
Part II considers the primary doctrinal consequence of inter-statutory application: conflict. CERCLA prohibits certain suits that RCRA authorizes. For
instance, where cleanup has started but is stalled, RCRA may allow a suit to go
forward, but CERCLA almost certainly would not. Part II then looks at how
courts have talked about (or not talked about) this conflict. But very few of the
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courts considering the scope of CERCLA section 113(h)'s inter-statutory application have addressed the issue of conflict at all. Most that have looked at the
issue have quickly assumed that CERCLA, the newer statute, trumps without
applying any of the well-developed doctrine governing resolution of inter-statutory conflict.
Part III undertakes the statutory analysis that so many courts have glossed
over. Applying the traditional conflict resolution tools - particularly the doctrine of implied repeal - Part III considers whether CERCLA section 113(h)
should indeed trump RCRA. It concludes that although some of the language
in section 113 supports finding repeal by implication, the statute as a whole
does not. Instead, to avoid that repeal, the two statutes ought to be harmonized
where possible. It argues that in most cases harmonization is indeed possible,
but, where it is not, RCRA, the more specific statute, and not CERCLA, the
newer statute, should apply.
By laying out a plausible and textually grounded doctrinal alternative to
the conclusion drawn by most courts, Part III demonstrates that, following a
textualist approach, CERCLA section 113(h) has two possible meanings. The
language of the provision itself supports a sweeping reading, while the context
of the remainder of the statutory scheme suggests a narrower reading. Part IV
goes on to consider why, given this viable alternative, courts have consistently
opted for the broader reading. Many courts have been able to avoid grappling
with the problem because they have faced situations without conflict - i.e.,
situations in which RCRA and CERCLA mandated the same outcome. This is,
of course, a limited explanation. Many courts have simply pointed to the plain
language without careful exploration of the issue, but two trends in the case law
offer further explanation. First, courts appear concerned with treading on
agency expertise. In this highly technical area of the law, a jurisdiction-stripping rule saves courts from complex technical analysis. Second, courts appear
concerned with administrability. A rule treating RCRA or some subset of
RCRA suits differently from other challenges threatens the administrability of
CERCLA and may be manipulated by plaintiffs. Part IV argues that neither of
these policy considerations is persuasive in this context.
Finally, Part IV concludes by raising some countervailing policy considerations that would support adopting the narrower reading of section 113(h). Primary among those reasons is the underlying purpose of both RCRA and
CERCLA: to protect the public and the environment from toxic harms.
I.

THE

STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND THE PROBLEM

A.

Toxic Site Cleanup: The FederalStatutes

Prior to the enactment of RCRA and CERCLA, state tort nuisance law
provided the primary mechanisms for cleanup of toxic sites. 4 Together, RCRA
' In many jurisdictions, state law continues to play a robust role in addressing toxic harms. Although some federal courts have held that RCRA and CERCLA preempt those laws, others have
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and CERCLA establish a comprehensive scheme governing handling and
cleanup of toxic waste. RCRA, enacted in 1976 and beefed up in 1984, governs toxic waste from "cradle-to-grave," establishing requirements for the
transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of toxic waste and requiring

permits for those activities.5 CERCLA ensures that parties responsible for haz-

ardous waste contamination may be "tagged with the cost of their actions. ''6

CERCLA's strict liability scheme not only provides for cleanup of past pollution but also creates substantial incentives for firms to avoid pollution in the
future.7 In addition to imposing monetary liability on past polluters, CERCLA
establishes a federal fund for cleanup, federal cleanup authority, and guidelines
for toxic site cleanup procedure.'
The first step in a CERCLA cleanup is "removal action," which includes:
immediate cleanup to mitigate initial dangers; studies, in particular the Reme-

dial Investigation and Feasibility Study ("RI/FS"), whose purpose is to identify
the scope of harm and evaluate possible cleanup plans; and selection of "reme-

dial actions."9 "Remedial actions" are meant to provide permanent solutions

for contaminated sites.' 0 The statute is fairly flexible regarding how EPA (or
another state or federal agency) proceeds through these steps."I EPA can undertake cleanup itself and then bring a cost recovery action. 2 This avenue is available to any private party as well. Alternately, EPA can require the polluter to

undertake the cleanup, either by going to court and seeking an injunction or by

allowed damage actions and medical monitoring claims to go forward. See, e.g., Durfey v. E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co., 59 F.3d 121 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that section 113(h) did not bar a
state law medical monitoring claim), Alexandra B. Klass, CERCLA, State Law, and Federalismin
the 21st Century, 41 Sw. L. REv. 679, 691-703 (2012) (describing relevant state law claims and
the landscape of CERCLA preemption).
' "RCRA's primary purpose... is to reduce the generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the
proper treatment, storage, and disposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, 'so as to
minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment."' Meghrig v. KFC
W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)); see also Richard J. Lazarus,
CongressionalDescent: The Demise of DeliberativeDemocracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO.
L.J. 619, 627 (2006) (describing RCRA's 1984 amendments, in comparison to the law's original
enactment, as a "comprehensive, detailed, and highly prescriptive" scheme).
6 United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 56 (1998) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted).
7

See, e.g.,

RICHARD

L.

REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLIcY

604-05 (2008) (describing

how the ex post liability scheme transmits incentives to generators of hazardous waste and owners
of hazardous waste sites and arguing that the combination of ex ante regulation and ex post liability is ideal to both create the proper incentives for generators of hazardous waste and owners of
hazardous waste sites and to circumvent the insolvency problem).
8 CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (2012); see also REVESz, supra note 7, at 605 (pointing
out the limits of a liability scheme where firms are insolvent).
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9601(23); Frey v. EPA ("Frey I/"), 403 F.3d 828, 835 (7th Cir. 2005).
1042 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9601(24).
" See Michael P. Healy, JudicialReview and CERCLA Response Actions: Interpretive Strategies
in the Face of Plain Meaning, 17 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 6 (1993) (observing that "CERCLA
also provides EPA with increased authority and flexibility to respond to releases or threatened
releases that may pose an 'imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare
or the environment"' (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a))).
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607.
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issuing a unilateral administrative order. 3 CERCLA also includes several provisions that incentivize polluters to enter into consent decrees addressing both
cleanup and cost recovery. In particular, the settlements can insulate firms
from both contribution suits from other polluters of the same site and enforcement and cost recovery actions from the government.14 Polluters are therefore
often involved in cleanup from an early stage.' 5
Although CERCLA provides the primary structure for cleanup, RCRA
also plays a role. In particular, although RCRA permitting requirements do not
apply to cleanup activities, RCRA standards for handling, storage, and disposal
of toxic waste continue to apply at all stages of cleanup. 6
B.

Citizen Enforcement

Like almost every other federal environmental statute passed since 1978,
RCRA and CERCLA create causes of action for citizen enforcement. 7 RCRA
creates multiple private rights of action for citizens.' 8 First, it authorizes citizen
enforcement actions, allowing citizens to sue "any person ... who is alleged to
be in violation of' specific RCRA requirements. 9 For instance, citizens can
prosecute permit requirement violations. Second, it authorizes citizen endangerment actions, allowing citizens to force cleanup where ongoing or past mishandling of toxic waste results in "imminent and substantial endangerment to
human health and the environment."20
13 42

U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606. If a polluter fails to comply with a unilateral administrative order,
EPA can impose hefty fines. Id. §§ 9606(b)(1), 9607(c)(3). For a helpful description of the
cleanup process, see Cleanup Process, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/cleanup/index.htm
(last visited Mar. 27, 2013) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
1442 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f)(2), 9622.
" Polluters can conduct the RI/FS themselves, with federal oversight. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)
(allowing private parties to conduct an RI/FS with federal permission and oversight). One purpose of CERCLA is to provide funding where polluters are not identifiable or are insolvent. H.
REP. 96-1016, at 20 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6123 (findings of the House
Committee of Interstate and Foreign Commerce).
16 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1)(B) (requiring the executive to take into account the "goals, objectives,
and requirements" of RCRA when developing a remedial plan under CERCLA); id. § 9621(e)
(establishing that no federal permit shall be required for "any removal or remedial action conducted entirely onsite, where such remedial action is selected and carried out in compliance with
[CERCLA]"); see also id. § 9652(d) (declaring that CERCLA will not alter the obligations and
liabilities of any persons from other laws involving toxic waste).
"7The one exception is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), 7
U.S.C. § 136 (2012). See JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 6 (1987) (hypothesizing that FIFRA contains no citizen suit
provision because although every other environmental statute originated in the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee and the House Commerce and Transportation Committee,
FIFRA originated in "the more conservative Agriculture Committees in both houses of
Congress").
Is RCRA actually authorizes three types of suits, but only two are relevant to this Article. The
third allows citizens to sue the EPA administrator "where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under [RCRA] which is not discretionary .
42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a)(2).
'9 RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) (2012).
20 RCRA § 7002(a)(l)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
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Congress added the latter provision in 1984, as part of a series of amendments that extended the scope of RCRA's requirements.2 One House Committee explained that the expansion of citizen suits would complement EPA
enforcement "particularly where the Government is unable to take action be-

cause of inadequate resources."22
CERCLA likewise provides for private suits, allowing citizens to bring
suit "against any person (including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of any standard,
regulation, condition, requirement, or order which has become effective pursuant to [CERCLA] ....

"I'

Unlike the RCRA provision, which allows citizens

to seek injunctions requiring cleanup, CERCLA citizen suits allow only enforcement of CERCLA's substantive cleanup standards.2 4 In other words, a citizen cannot compel cleanup but can require that ongoing cleanup meet
CERCLA's standards.
Citizen enforcement serves a dual function. First, it fosters agency accountability.25 Most environmental citizen suit provisions require that prior to
bringing suit, the citizen first give notice to the relevant federal and state agencies and the alleged polluter and then wait, usually either sixty or ninety days
before filing suit.2 6 The function of the notice requirement is to goad the government (or the polluter) into action.27 Notice provides citizens a formalized
means to alert the relevant state or federal agency that there is an ongoing
pollution law violation requiring attention.2" The agency can then choose to act
on the information or allow the citizen to sue. The polluter can choose to begin
a voluntary cleanup or wait and try its luck in court.

Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 401, 98 Stat. 3221
(1984).
22H. REP. No. 98-198 at 53 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5612.
23CERCLA § 310(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1) (2012).
24
Jeffrey M. Gaba & Mary E. Kelly, The Citizen Suit Provision of CERCLA: A Sheep in Wolf's
Clothing?, 43 Sw. L. J. 929, 937-40 (1990) (explaining why the CERCLA citizen provision does
not allow citizens to compel cleanup where the government has taken no action). The House
Judiciary Committee added language to the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act ("SARA") that paralleled RCRA's endangerment action provision, but the Conference Committee removed it, concluding that it was redundant. Id. at 935-36 (describing this legislative
history).
25
James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER
L. Syrp. J. 1, 5 (2003) (arguing that citizen suits matter because they foster "rule of law, agency
accountability, representational democracy, and environmental stewardship").
26 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 304(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2012); Clean Water Act § 505(b), 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2012).
27MILLER, supra note 17, at 44 ("The purpose behind the 60-day notice requirements is clearly to
enable and encourage the government to perform its enforcement role.") (citing legislative history
of the Clean Air Act).
28
RCRA and CERCLA both contain notice provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(d)(1) (60-day notice
requirement for CERCLA suits); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(A) (60-day notice requirement for
RCRA enforcement actions); id. § 6972 (b)(2)(A) (90-day notice requirement for RCRA endangerment actions).
2
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Second, citizen suits supplement agency efforts.29 Although early citizen

suits focused primarily on requiring federal agencies to carry out non-discretionary duties, citizens in the 1980s began bringing suits in large numbers directly against polluters.3 0 In large part, this expansion in the use of citizen suit
provisions came in response to a decline in enforcement during the Reagan
administration. 3

In essence, citizen suit provisions empower citizens to act as private attorneys general.32 And they remain important because they work. 33 They are an
insurance policy against deregulation through non-enforcement. An agency
can choose to reallocate its resources as it sees fit, but it cannot prevent environmental laws from being enforced.
Under RCRA and CERCLA, as with most environmental statutes, citizens
are secondary enforcers. If, in response to notice, the polluter takes sufficient
steps to abate the harm, the potential suit may become moot.3 4 If, in response

to notice, the government takes action, the citizen group is barred from suit.
Both RCRA and CERCLA bar suit where the government "is diligently prosecuting" an enforcement action. 35 The primary function of the "diligently prosecuting" bar is to prevent redundant successive enforcement that could be
inefficient for courts, unfair for defendants (because of the risk of inconsistent
outcomes), and expensive for taxpayers. 36

29MILLER, supra note 17, at 4 ("The citizen suit sections were developed as the answer to the

government's failure to enforce, whether caused by lack of will or lack of resources."); see also
Jeffrey G. Miller, Overlooked Issues in the "Diligent Prosecution" Citizen Suit Preclusion, 10
WIDENER L. SYMp. J. 63, 63 (2003) ("Congress sought to attain full compliance with environmental statutes. It reasoned that multiple enforcers would provide more comprehensive and effective
enforcement than one enforcer.").
30 MILLER, supra note 17, at 10-15 (describing the historical trends in the use of citizen suit
provisions).
MILLER, supra note 17, at 11 (noting that "many of the national environmental groups, including [the Natural Resources Defense Council], perceived a breakdown in EPA enforcement in
1981 and 1982, particularly under the Clean Water Act, and were anxious to reverse this trend").
32MILLER, supra note 17, at 1 & n. 1 (citing numerous cases describing the use and value of citizen
suits).
" May, supra note 25, at 3-4 ("Citizen suits work: they have transformed the environmental
movement . . . . Citizen suits have secured compliance by myriad agencies and thousands of
polluting facilities, diminished pounds of pollution produced by the billions, and protected hundreds of rare species and thousands of acres of ecologically important land. The foregone monetary value of citizen enforcement has conserved innumerable agency resources and saved
taxpayers billions.").
4 See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 64 (1987) (holding that provision of Clean Water Act allowing citizens to seek injunction against discharge permit
violations did not confer jurisdiction over "wholly past" violations).
3542 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B) (barring RCRA enforcement actions in the face of government enforcement under RCRA); id. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(i) (barring RCRA endangerment actions in the face
of ongoing government enforcement under RCRA or CERCLA); id. § 9659(d)(2) (barring CERCLA actions in the face of ongoing government enforcement under RCRA or CERCLA).
36See Jeffrey G. Miller, Theme & Variation in Statutory PreclusionsAgainst Successive Environmental Enforcement Actions by EPA & Citizens, Part One: Statutory Bars in Citizen Suit Provisions, 28 HAJv. ENVTL. L. Rav. 401, 402 (2004) (describing interpretation of these notice and bar
preclusion provisions as an exercise in determining how much deference to give to EPA and state
prosecutorial discretion); see also MILLER, supra note 29.
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Limits on citizen enforcement also protect legitimate cooperation between
government and polluter.

Enforcement through consent decrees reduces

cleanup costs both for polluters and taxpayers, but citizen suits can stifle legitimate cooperation. Particularly in the CERCLA context where the consent decree process greatly reduces the costs of cleanup, citizen suits may reduce

willingness to participate in negotiations with the government if there is the
possibility that polluters may face expensive court-ordered cleanups anyway.37

Perhaps because of this additional policy concern, RCRA also bars endangerment suits in several other circumstances, all related to whether or not there

is ongoing CERCLA activity at the site in question. Specifically, RCRA bars
endangerment suits when the federal or state government "is actually engaging

in a removal action" under CERCLA; "has incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study [(RI/FS) under CERCLA] and is dili-

gently proceeding with a remedial action" under CERCLA; or "has obtained a
court order (including a consent decree) or issued an administrative order"
under CERCLA.35 These provisions are carefully designed to allow successive

enforcement (i.e., enforcement by citizens and enforcement by the government)

only where government enforcement is stalled.3 9 In other words, not just any
government enforcement is sufficient to bar citizen suits; instead, the government must have actually obtained or issued a cleanup order, be "actually engaging" in a removal action, "diligently proceeding with a remedial action," or
"diligently prosecuting" an enforcement action. 40 The use of the present tense

in each of these subsections is particularly significant -

CERCLA cleanup

activities must be currently ongoing. 4' Congress included the preclusion provi-

sions to ensure that citizen suits would not interfere with federal cleanups, but
the conference committee explained that the bar was to be "applied only when

37Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, &

Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENvL. L.J. 81, 140-41 (2002) (arguing that citizen suits can reduce the
effectiveness of bargaining between the regulator and the regulatee: where the regulator might
otherwise agree not to pursue enforcement in exchange for the promise of some compensating
environmental benefit, a citizen suit might reduce the willingness of the regulatee to agree to the
beneficial trade). Of course, not all cooperation is a good thing. Citizen suits can also police
against capture. See id. at 132-37; see also infra Subpart IV.B.3 (limiting citizen suits too much
may also be problematic because the threat of citizen suits can be a catalyst to restart stalled
negotiations).
38 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(ii)-(iv).
31Miller, supra note 36, at 403-04 (noting that the diligent prosecution bar can be read to mean
that it applies only to prosecutions that can reasonably be expected to bring about compliance).
o42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
41RCRA "speaks in the present tense, of private actions being barred by removal or remedial
actions which are presently proceeding." City of Stamps, Ark. v. Alcoa, Inc., No. 05-1049, 2006
WL 2254406, at *13 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 7, 2006) (holding that because response activity was complete, plaintiff was not barred under RCRA). Congress's choice of present tense indicates "the
statute's temporal reach." Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2236 (2010); see also MILLER,
supra note 29, at 75-82 (considering the timing of the "diligently prosecuting" provision and
concluding that only ongoing actions could preclude citizen suit).
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the RI[/]FS, design, and construction
activities at a site occur in a continuous,
42
uninterrupted sequence.

Central to this Article, CERCLA likewise contains an additional preclusion provision, added to the statute as part of SARA in 1986. Located in the
portion of the statute governing procedure for federal court review, rather than
within the citizen suit provision itself, CERCLA section 113(h) establishes that
"[n]o Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law... to review any
challenges to removal or remedial action selected under [CERCLA]. ' '43 Unlike RCRA's carefully constructed preclusion provision, this section "effectuates a 'blunt withdrawal of federal jurisdiction."' 44
Section 113(h) codified an approach courts had already begun taking in
response to polluter recalcitrance.4 1 In CERCLA's early years, polluters often
tried to evade liability (or, at the least, minimize response costs) by challenging
government cleanup plans before they were implemented. 46 Many also brought

suit in order to resolve up front the extent of their liability. Some courts responded by concluding that at least some pre-enforcement review was unavailable. 47 One court, cited favorably in the legislative history of SARA, explained
42 H.R. Conf. Rep. 98-1133 at 118 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5689 (noting

that EPA estimated that four months would pass between the completion of the RI/FS and the
implementation of the remedy).
4342 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2012). The entire provision reads as follows:
"(h) Timing of review
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law other than under section 1332
of Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) or under State law which is
applicable or relevant and appropriate under section 9621 of this title (relating to
cleanup standards) to review any challenges to removal or remedial action selected
under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued under section 9606(a) of
this title, in any action except one of the following:
(1) An action under section 9607 of this title to recover response costs or damages
or for contribution.
(2) An action to enforce an order issued under section 9606(a) of this title or to
recover a penalty for violation of such order.
(3) An action for reimbursement under section 9606(b)(2) of this title.
(4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating to citizens suits) alleging
that the removal or remedial action taken under section 9604 of this title or
secured under section 9606 of this title was in violation of any requirement of
this chapter. Such an action may not be brought with regard to a removal where
a remedial action is to be undertaken at the site.
(5) An action under section 9606 of this title in which the United States has moved
to compel a remedial action." Id.
"Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Richardson, 214 F.3d 1379, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting
North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1991)).
4"See Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1019 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that the "limits
§ 113(h) establishes are designed to prevent time-consuming litigation from delaying the prompt
clean-up of these sites").
'This article uses the term "polluter" to refer to what CERCLA terms "potentially responsible
parties," or parties that may be liable for the release or threatened release of toxic substances. 42
U.S.C. § 9613(g)(1)(B), CERCLA § 113(g)(l)(B) (introducing the phrase "potentially responsible
party"); id. § 9607(a) (listing categories of potentially responsible parties). It uses the term in a
descriptive rather than a pejorative sense; CERCLA, after all, is a strict liability statute.
47See, e.g., J.V. Peters & Co., Inc. v. Admin., EPA, 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1985); see also
Michael P. Healy, The Effectiveness & Fairnessof Superfund's JudicialReview PreclusionProvi-
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why a bar on pre-enforcement review was so important to the integrity of CERCLA's statutory scheme:
[E]arlier statutes as well did not permit EPA to respond quickly to
problems at a site. While EPA had authority under other environmental statutes to bring legal actions to force cleanup, it lacked clear authority and funds to respond immediately to serious public health
hazards from such sites and releases before the legal determinations
of liability were made. CERCLA was designed to address this problem by establishing the authority and funding to take immediate response actions, without the need to await a judicial determination of
liability (and likewise, before any final administrative determination
of liability).

48

That court went on to express concern that allowing judicial review could
delay implementation of the EPA-selected remedy for years at great risk to
human health and the environment: "Meanwhile with every passing rainstorm

and each day while melting snow percolates through the Lone Pine Landfill
deadly chemical wastes would be carried towards the water supplies of substantial numbers of people. '49 Following the courts' lead, Congress enacted section
113(h).5 0 Polluters would have to wait until cleanup was done to bring
challenges."

sion, 15 VA. ENvrL. L. J. 271, 289-91 (1995-1996) (discussing J.V. Peters and other pre-SARA
cases barring pre-enforcement judicial review).
48 Lone Pine Steering Committee v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487, 1495 (D. N.J. 1985), aft'd, 777 F.2d
882 (3d Cir. 1985). The Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works cited Lone Pine
when it offered the following explanation of section 113(h):
As several courts have noted, the scheme and purposes of CERCLA would be disrupted
by affording judicial review of orders or response actions prior to commencement of a
government enforcement or cost recovery action. These cases correctly interpret CERCLA with regard to the unavailability of pre-enforcement review. This amendment is to
expressly recognize that pre-enforcement review would be a significant obstacle to the
implementation of response actions and the use of administrative orders. Pre-enforcement review would lead to considerable delay in providing cleanups, would increase
response costs, and would discourage settlements and voluntary cleanups.
S. Rep. No. 99-11, at 58 (1985) (citation omitted).
49Lone Pine Steering Committee, 600 F. Supp. at 1495.
so Healy, supra note 47, at 289-91 (arguing that Congress intentionally picked up on and codified
this line of cases).
51See New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1249 (10th Cir. 2006) (observing that the
purpose of section 113(h) is to promote efficient cleanup); see also Healy, supra note 47, at
290-91 (explaining that the purpose of section 113(h) was to prevent delay and foreclose piecemeal review of cleanup actions); Nathan H. Steams, Cleaning up the Mess or Messing up the
Cleanup: Does CERCLA's Jurisdictional Bar (Section 113(h)) Prohibit Citizen Suits Brought
Under RCRA, 22 B.C. ENvmL. AFFAIRs L. REv. 49, 60 (1994) (arguing that Congress meant to
distinguish between suits brought by polluters and those brought by other citizens including environmental groups).
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C. Inter-Statutory Application of Section 113(h)

Perhaps because CERCLA section 113(h) was enacted as a reaction to the
particular problem of polluters' use of citizen suits to delay cleanup rather than
as part of a comprehensive citizen suit provision, as in RCRA and other environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, CERCLA's preclusion provision is unique because it is not, on its face, limited to
causes of action brought under CERCLA itself. Relying on section 113(h)'s
broad language and on the well-articulated purpose of preventing delay, courts
have almost universally given it inter-statutory application." "Section 113(h)
is clear and unequivocal[,]" one court explained. 3 "[T]he unqualified language of the section precludes 'any challenges' to CERCLA Section 104 cleanups, not just those brought under other provisions of CERCLA." Every circuit that has considered the issue has determined that the bar applies to RCRA
suits. 5
Courts have rejected even procedural challenges. For instance, in Schalk
v. Reilly, plaintiffs brought suit to force the EPA to produce an environmental
impact statement assessing the environmental impacts of the remedy selection,
and to require the agency to conduct more public hearings on the remedy selec-

tion.5 6 Rejecting the argument that the plaintiffs were "not really challenging
the [remedy selection], but merely asking that certain procedural requirements
be met," the court concluded that "challenges to the procedure employed in
selecting a remedy nevertheless impact the implementation of the remedy and
result in the same delays Congress sought to avoid by passage of the statute."57
Much of the case law on the provision has focused on the meaning of the
word "challenge." Most courts have concluded that any suit that will "impact

the implementation" of the government's selected CERCLA response action
constitutes a challenge.58 Looking beyond the underlying cause of action,

2 See, e.g., Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1332 (10th Cir. 2008) (RCRA); Oil, Chem. &
Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Richardson, 214 F.3d 1379, 1382-83 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(NEPA); N. Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1991) (RCRA & NEPA);
Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991) (NHPA); Schalk v. Reilly, 900
F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir. 1990) (NEPA).
3McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1995).
4 Id. (quoting section 113(h)) (citing Ark. Peace Ctr. v. Ark. Dep't of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1217 (8th Cir. 1993) and N. Shore Gas, 930 F.2d at 1244).
" The Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all reached the
issue. APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2003); Clinton Cnty. Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d
1018 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc); N. Shore Gas, 930 F.2nd at 1239; Ark. Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at
1212; McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1995); Cannon, 538
F.3d at 1328; OSI, Inc. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2008). In DC, only a district
court has reached the issue. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 2d I 1, 120
(D.D.C. 2012). The First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have no published cases on the issue at
all (although the Fourth has one unpublished district court opinion finding the provision applicable
to RCRA cases). R.E. Goodson Constr. Co. v. Int'l Paper Co., No. C/A 4:02-4184-RBH, 2005
WL 2614927 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 2005).
56900 F.2d 1091, 1094 (1990).
57
ld. at 1097.
58See, e.g., id.
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courts take a pragmatic approach, considering, if the requested remedy were

granted, whether it would interfere with or change the ongoing response action.59 For instance, in Broward Garden Tenants Association v. EPA, plaintiffs
brought suit under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Civil Rights Acts
of 1964 and 1968, and the Fair Housing Act alleging that defendants were using

an inadequate cleanup plan for a landfill site adjacent to the housing project to

perpetuate de jure segregation. 60 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that because
the complaint sought injunctive relief - in particular, an order that the defendants adopt and implement stricter remediation standards - the suit challenged
61
the selected remediation plan.
As Part III.A.2 will explore in more depth, not every court has read "challenge" so broadly, and a few have identified other limitations to section
113(h)'s scope. 62 The next section explores, however, what most courts have

not -

the statutory implications of this broad reading of CERCLA. 63

" See, e.g., id. at 1091 (rejecting suit under NEPA because goal of seeking additional environmental impact assessment was selection of a different remedy); Reynolds v. Lujan, 785 F. Supp. 152,
154 (D.N.M. 1992) (concluding suit was a challenge because granting relief would alter ongoing
response activity).
6 311 F.3d 1066, 1070 (11 th Cir. 2002). Applying this test, several courts have allowed suits for
damages, as opposed to injunctive relief, to proceed. For instance, in Costnerv. URS Consultants,
Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 675 (8th Cir. 1998), the Eighth Circuit concluded that a suit for damages under
the False Claims Act was not a challenge because it sought only financial penalties; the plaintiffs
did not seek to alter the terms of cleanup. Id. at 675. See also Beck v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 62
F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that suit for damages caused by diversion of water as
part of cleanup plan was not a challenge because, "[a]lthough determination of whether [defendant's] diversions were 'wrongful' may require examination of the EPA's orders, resolution of the
damage claim would not involve altering the terms of the cleanup order" (internal citation and
footnote omitted)). But see New Mexico v. General Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1249-50 (10th Cir.
2006) (concluding the "[s]tate's argument that it is not seeking to alter or expand the EPA's
response plan but rather only to acquire money damages falls on deaf ears. Any relief would
substitute a federal court's judgment for the authorized judgment of both the EPA and [the New
Mexico Department of Environment]"). To a certain extent, the availability of damages may restore to potential plaintiffs the enforcement power that section 113(h) takes away. But this is a
limited consolation for two reasons. First, although it may create incentives for a polluter to take
more care the next time around, it cannot achieve cleanup of an already contaminated site. Second, it is available to a much narrower class of plaintiffs. Only those directly harmed could seek
damages; whereas, any ci'tizen potentially within the zone of imminent and substantial endangerment could seek relief in the absence of section 113(h).
61 Id. at 1072-73.
62 See, e.g., United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1577 (10th Cir. 1993) (a suit that sought to
"stay the CERCLA remedial action ... clearly constituted a challenge to the CERCLA remedial
action," whereas a suit that sought to require compliance with RCRA during the remedial action
did not).
63 One additional point about the existing case law bears mentioning before moving on. Despite
the fact that these cases deal squarely with a question of statutory interpretation, not one of them
has considered either whether EPA has interpreted the section or whether that interpretation merits
any deference under Chevron U.S.A Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
The easy response is that although EPA has devoted extensive pages of the Code of Federal Regulations to setting out procedures for selection of removal and remedial actions, it has given no
consideration at all to what it means to "challenge[ ] ... [a] removal or remedial action selected
under section 9604." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2012). Of course, the EPA has put forth an interpretation of the provision on numerous occasions in the context of litigation, but such positions are
entitled to no deference. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988)
("We have never applied the principle of [Chevron] to agency litigating positions that are wholly
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IMPLICATIONS OF "BLUNT WITHDRAWAL"

Inter-statutory application of CERCLA's preclusion provision is not without consequences. Setting aside, for the moment, potential policy costs, there is
a doctrinal consequence, consideration of which is well within the bounds of a
traditional textualist analysis: inter-statutory conflict. Inter-statutory application of section 113(h) creates an irreconcilable conflict with RCRA. Specifically, CERCLA section 113(h) bars more suits than does either RCRA section
7002(b)(1)(B), which bars certain citizen enforcement suits, or RCRA section
7002(b)(2)(B), which bars certain citizen endangerment suits. Section 7002
functions more like a scalpel, while section 113(h) works like a hack saw. Extending CERCLA's jurisdictional bar to RCRA citizen suits conflicts both with
RCRA's own preclusion provisions and with the provisions of RCRA creating
private rights of action.
After demonstrating that a conflict exists, this Part considers the extent to
which courts have grappled with this conflict. Indeed, the conflict is a problem

that few courts considering section 113(h) have acknowledged and even fewer
have resolved. As a whole, the case law addressing the relationship between
CERCLA section 113(h) and RCRA leaves the conflict between the two statutes unresolved. One court, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Colorado,
gave the issue thorough treatment and held that to avoid implied repeal of
RCRA it had to read section 113(h) not to apply to RCRA cases. 64 Why haven't
other courts followed suit? This Part explores how other courts have responded
to Colorado and argues that they have misconstrued it and essentially limited it
to its facts. Several other courts have acknowledged the issue but given precedence to CERCLA with little or no explanation or analysis.
A.

The Statutory Problem: Conflict

Conflict is to be avoided in statutory interpretation. It requires courts to

perform a legislative function - to choose which of Congress's enactments to
give effect. Accordingly, numerous doctrines of statutory interpretation, exunsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice. To the contrary, we have declined
to give deference to an agency counsel's interpretation of a statute where the agency itself has
articulated no position on the question .. ");
Sottera, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 627 F.3d 891,
903 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that the "Supreme Court held Chevron deference appropriate only
for statutory interpretations with the 'force of law' and ruled that an agency's litigation briefs unlike, for example, its regulations - do not warrant such deference") (internal citations omitted). The more difficult question is why EPA has not interpreted this provision and whether, if it
did, its interpretation would merit any deference. The D.C. Circuit has held several times that
"Chevron does not apply to statutes that... confer jurisdiction on the federal courts. It is well
established that interpreting statutes granting jurisdiction to Article III courts is exclusively the
province of the courts." Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 252 F.3d
473, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Reasoning that such
provisions do not delegate authority to federal agencies and that agencies have no particular expertise in interpreting them, the D.C. Circuit has undertaken de novo review. Id. at 480.
p990 F.2d 1565, 1575-79 (10th Cir. 1993).
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plored further in Part IV, below, counsel avoiding inter-statutory conflict and
set up norms for how to deal with it when it is unavoidable. Despite these
doctrines, the interpretation of section 113(h) preferred by most courts conflicts
with RCRA section 7002.
1.

Conflict Between Section 113(h) and RCRA's Enforcement Suit Bar

RCRA section 7002(b)(1)(B) bars enforcement actions only where the
government (state or federal) has already begun and is diligently prosecuting its
own RCRA enforcement action. Under RCRA alone, citizen enforcement actions can therefore proceed regardless of whether there is any CERCLA activity ongoing at the site in question. Accordingly, section 113(h), which bars
essentially all RCRA enforcement suits involving sites at which CERCLA activity is ongoing, bars a much larger universe of suits.
There are only two circumstances where an enforcement suit would be
barred under RCRA but not under CERCLA: where the government has opted
to use only RCRA to achieve cleanup or where the hazardous pollutant is petroleum.65 EPA has a long-standing policy to defer listing a site under CERCLA
where it could undertake cleanup under RCRA "to avoid duplicative actions,
maximize the number of cleanups, and help preserve the Superfund. '66 CERCLA cleanup can also take longer and be more expensive that other types of
cleanup. 67 In this category of suits, then, the RCRA provisions continue to
have applicability.
As figure one, below, illustrates, with the exception of this category,
where there is no CERCLA activity at all, all suits that section 7002(b)(1)(B)
would bar are also barred by section 113(h). And, there are many suits that
section 7002(b)(1)(B) does not bar that are nevertheless barred by section
113(h). RCRA expressly allows citizen enforcement actions to proceed despite
ongoing CERCLA activity. CERCLA section 113(h), as interpreted, does not.
This is a direct conflict. The same facts would lead to different and incompatible results under the two statutes.
For instance, Shea Homes Ltd. v. United States demonstrates the conflict
between RCRA section 7002(b)(1)(B) and CERCLA section 113(h).68 The
plaintiff, a real estate developer, purchased and developed a parcel of land formerly owned and utilized by the United States Air Force as a landfill. 69 Pursu65See

Ingrid B. Wuerth, Challenges to Federal Facility Cleanups & CERCLA Section 113(h), 8
TuL.ENvrL. L.J. 353, 362-63 & 362 n.49 (1995) (explaining that EPA will conserve resources by
declining to list sites subject to RCRA corrective action on the National Priorities List (such
listing is the first step of CERCLA cleanup)). EPA has broad discretion in whether it chooses to
list a site or not. See Apache Powder Co. v. United States, 968 F.2d 66, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(rejecting argument that EPA's choice to pursue cleanup under CERCLA as opposed to RCRA
was irrational); CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. 9601(14) (2012) (excluding petroleum from CERCLA's definition of "hazardous substance").
' Apache Powder Co., 968 F.2d at 69 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
67 Healy, supra note 47, at 276-77 (describing high costs of CERCLA cleanup); Apache Powder
Co., 968 F.2d at 69.
68 397 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
69
Id. at 1196.
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ant to CERCLA section 104, the Army. Corps of Engineers was "engag[ing] in
various efforts to investigate, remediate, and monitor the waste" on the property.70 Plaintiff brought suit alleging, among other things, that the Army Corps
was failing to comply with certain RCRA requirements related to methane containment.7 Analyzing the issue under section 113(h), the court held that the
suit for "injunctive relief to 'improve' the ongoing clean up ... constitute[d] a
'challenge' . . . and must therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."72
RCRA, by contrast, would allow this very same suit to proceed. Although
there was unarguably some CERCLA activity ongoing at the site, the only
RCRA bar for suit had not been triggered: the Army Corps had not "commenced" and was not "diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a
court of the United States or a State to require compliance with [a RCRA]
permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order."73
2.

Conflict Between Section 113(h) and RCRA's Endangerment Suit
Bar

The same problem exists with regard to section 7002(b)(2)(B), which bars
RCRA endangerment suits while certain CERCLA actions, including enforcement suits, removal actions, and remedial actions are moving forward. 74 The
RCRA endangerment suit provision anticipates that RCRA and CERCLA activity may take place at the same site and prevents RCRA endangerment suits
from interfering where the government "is diligently prosecuting" either a
RCRA or CERCLA suit, "is actually engaging in removal action[,]" or "is
diligently proceeding with a remedial action."
FIGURE

1:

SHOWING OVERLAP OF SUITS BARRED BY, UNDER
AND

E

RCRA

CERCLA

NoCERCLA
Activity

EAny CERCLAActivity ~

70Id. at 1197, 1201-04 (resolving question of whether cleanup was pursuant to section 104 or
section 120, which governs federal facilities). For a thorough treatment of issues specific to
cleanup of federal facilities, see Wuerth, supra note 65.
"7 2 Shea Homes Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1197, 1204.
/d.

at 1204.

7342 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B) (2012).
1442 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii); see supra notes 28, 35-42 (describing RCRA's preclusion
provisions).
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As with the bar on RCRA enforcement, the RCRA endangerment bar is
almost entirely a subset of the CERCLA bar. The same two exceptions apply:
Where the relevant federal or state agency opts not to use CERCLA as a
cleanup mechanism or where the pollutant involved is petroleum, section
113(h) is not triggered.
But where clean up proceeds pursuant to CERCLA, there are no circum-

stances that would result in RCRA preclusion but would not result in CERCLA
preclusion. And, again, there are some circumstances that would result in

CERCLA preclusion but not RCRA preclusion - the two provisions are not
coterminous. Although the range of endangerment actions barred under CERCLA but not RCRA is a smaller category than the category of enforcement
actions barred under CERCLA but not RCRA, it is nevertheless robust. The

RCRA preclusion provisions require ongoing CERCLA action and allow citizen suits to proceed after the federal government has undertaken some initial

CERCLA cleanup actions (including studies) but before the federal government
has begun "diligently" implementing a CERCLA remediation plan. In other
words, where a federal agency has undertaken and completed some initial study

or other removal action but has not actually moved forward with a final remedial plan, RCRA allows suit, but CERCLA does not. 75 As illustrated in Figure

2 below, CERCLA precludes suit from Time One through Time Four, with no
break. RCRA, by contrast precludes suit from Time One to Time Two 76 and
from Time Three to Time Four. 77 If there is a break in time between Time Two
and Time Three, or if cleanup passes Time Three but stalls, the statute does not

bar suit. 78

FIGURE 2:

TIMELINE OF

CERCLA AcTIvITY

Time One:
Commencement of
Response
Action
(Including RI/FS)

Tme Zero:Releaseor
Threatened Releaseof
Hazardous Substance

AT A CONTAMINATED SITE

Time Three:
Commencement
of
[ERemedial Action

TimeTwo:
Completionof
RI/FS (or other
response action)

Time Four:
Completion of
Remedial Action

71See, e.g., Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1332-33 (10th Cir. 2008).
7642 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (barring suit where EPA "has commenced and is actually
engaging" in a removal action).
7742 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(iii) (barring suit where the EPA "has incurred costs to initiate a [RI/
FS] and is diligently proceeding with a remedial action").
71 See, e.g., Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1498, 1509 (E.D. Wis. 1992)
("The parties point to no language in RCRA or CERCLA which indicates that Congress intended
to allow a party to bootstrap the EPA's actions so that the initiation of a RI/FS could meet both the
requirement that the EPA has incurred costs to initiate such an investigation and study and that it is
diligently proceeding with a remedial action. In order to give meaning to both requirements, this
Court must interpret § 9672(b)(2)(B)(iii) to require both that the EPA has initiated a RI/FS and is
diligently proceeding with some remedial action beyond the remedial investigation and feasibility
study.").
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illustrates this situation.7 9 Firm A operates a coal tar manufacturing plant and
uses coal tar waste to fill in an adjacent wetland. Hazardous pollutants in the
coal tar waste - including benzene and other volatile organic compounds begin to leach into the groundwater and discharge into a nearby river that is
used by the local residential population for subsistence fishing. The site is
listed under CERCLA, and the EPA undertakes an RIIFS. ° The study determines that the contamination poses a serious risk to neighboring communities,
evaluates several possible cleanup methods, and identifies a preferred strategy.
After completing the study, EPA begins negotiations with Firm A, attempting to
develop a consent decree to govern the scope of cleanup. Six years pass. A
local environmental group files an endangerment action against Firm A, alleging that the coal tar waste is creating an "imminent and substantial endangerment to health and the environment" and asking the court to order Firm A to
undertake cleanup. Under the current case law in most circuits, the suit is almost certainly barred under CERCLA because the study itself is a response
action, and further remedial action "is to be undertaken." 81 The suit could,
however, likely proceed under RCRA because EPA has passed Time Two but
has not yet reached Time Three.
Conflict could also occur in a second similar situation - scenario two.
Imagine the same underlying facts as described above. Instead of entering into
negotiations, EPA decides to undertake cleanup on its own. It commences a
remedial action - for instance, it incurs costs for requisition of a bulldozer to
begin soil excavation - thus passing Time Three, but then reallocates those
funds elsewhere and takes no further action toward implementing a remedy.
Here, EPA has passed Time Three, but is not, as section 7002(b)(2)(B)(iii) requires, "diligently proceeding" toward Time Four.
Although these types of delays occur all the time,82 these cases tend not to
get fully litigated because Time Three often occurs (or EPA begins progressing
toward Time Four) before the litigation reaches any kind of conclusion. Thus,
although the suit was not precluded at commencement, it may subsequently
become moot. In the case of scenario one, a citizen suit may be exactly what is
required to jumpstart the negotiations or to ensure that while negotiations regarding comprehensive cleanup drag on at a crawl, Firm A takes some type of
response action to prevent imminent and substantial endangerment.83
79See supra note 2.
80Such a study is used to establish the scope of harm and to identify and assess possible cleanup

procedures. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(a)(2) ('The purpose of the [RI/FS] is to assess site conditions
and evaluation alternatives to the extent necessary to select a remedy.").
81CERCLA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4) (2012).
82See Hilary Sigman, The Pace of Progressat Superfund Sites: Policy Goals & Interest Group
Influence, 44 J.L. & ECON. 315, 317 (2001) (describing ways in which speed of cleanup is affected by interest groups and noting, in particular, that polluters with deep pockets tend to slow
down the process).
83It is also possible that a citizen suit under these circumstances would have the opposite effect. It
could distract resources from the negotiations and slow down the settlement process. Because a
settlement would, however, likely moot a suit, whether the suit jumpstarts the negotiations may
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In either scenario, if not for 113(h), the citizen group could file suit against
Firm A, seeking to require Firm A to carry out the remedy that EPA had failed
to complete. Further, the court could order Firm A to implement the remedy
84
already selected and would not need to craft its own remedy from scratch.
3.

True Conflict?

If section 113(h) merely broadened the scope of RCRA's preclusion provisions, this would not be a true conflict. Instead, this would be a relatively easy
case for repeal by implication because the newer statute would occupy the entire field covered by the earlier enactment.85 Put another way, the older enactment would simply be surplusage. But section 113(h) does more than broaden
the scope of suits barred; it changes the contours of a carefully articulated
scheme authorizing certain suits and barring others. Sections 7002(b)(1)(B)
and (b)(2)(B) carve out exceptions to a set of statutory private rights of action
authorized in sections 7002(a)(1)(A) and (B). 86 RCRA authorizes private actions in a set of cases the contours of which are defined in part by its preclusion
provision. Assuming section 113(h) is read to apply to RCRA suits, the two
statutes are in conflict because one subset of citizen suits is authorized by
RCRA but barred by CERCLA. In other words, CERCLA does more than
simply broaden the scope of one7 of RCRA' s provisions. It narrows the scope of
another of RCRA's provisions.1
B.

The Court Response (or Lack Thereof)

Although the scope of the conflict is much larger for RCRA enforcement
suits than for RCRA endangerment suits, section 113(h) nevertheless creates
depend on whether the Firm believes it will get a better result from the negotiations or from the
suit.
I See infra Part IV.A (discussing concern of courts about stepping on EPA's toes and wading into
the technical issues).
11NoRMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 1A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION § 23:9 (7th ed. 2012) (stating that where a later statute is "intended to occupy the
entire field covered by a prior enactment" courts will often find implied repeal); Note, Repeal by
Implication, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1039, 1045-46 (1955) (describing a sort of repeal by field
preemption).
See Solid Waste Disposal Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012).
several of the cases applying section 113(h) to other statutes, courts have observed that the
sole result of inter-statutory application is to narrow the scope and timing of possible citizen suits
and thus there were no concerns about repeal by implication because there are no impacts on the
other statute's substantive provisions. Those cases dealt, however, with the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and the National Historic Preservation Act ("NHPA"), neither of which
has its own citizen suit provision. See Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1020 n. 14 (3d
Cir. 1991) (finding clear Congressional intent for applying CERCLA section 113(h) to NHPA);
see also Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Richardson, 214 F.3d 1379, 1382-83 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (NEPA); N. Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 1991); Schalk v.
Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1096-97 (7th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, although application of section
113(h) does indeed narrow the universe of NEPA and NHPA claims, it does not directly narrow
the applicability of any provision of NEPA or NHPA. The ease with which these cases dismiss the
concern of repeal by implication should not carry over into the RCRA context.
87 In
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conflict with both RCRA section 7002(b)(1)(B) and RCRA section
7002(b)(2)(B). Where there is conflict between two statutes, a court has several choices. It could choose among the two statutes and apply only one of
them (either the older or the newer). Or it could interpret one or both of the
statutes in such a way as to avoid the conflict entirely. A number of canons of
statutory interpretation - the presumption against implied repeals, the preference for newer over older, the preference for specific over general, to name a
few - offer guidance on which option to select, but here, most courts have
selected without analysis, opting to apply the newer statute without acknowledging the conflict.
A handful of courts have recognized the conflict but allowed CERCLA
section 113(h) to trump without applying any of the well-developed doctrines
of conflict resolution. These courts have asked only whether Congress intended for CERCLA section 113(h) to apply to RCRA suits and, despite arguments by plaintiffs to do so, did not consider the consequences of that
application for RCRA's own preclusion provisions. For instance, a recent D.C.
District Court rejected a repeal by implication argument, explaining that:
Congress, in enacting CERCLA section 113(h) after RCRA was enacted, made no mention of RCRA or its citizen-suit provisions.
Therefore, this court can only conclude that Congress not only contemplated RCRA when it enacted section 113(h), but also sought to
withdraw jurisdiction for RCRA claims, even where such claims
were otherwise authorized under RCRA.8 s
To support this proposition, the court relied on Jachs v. American Univer-

sity, which did not involve a RCRA claim,89 and on River Village West LLC v.
Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company, in which the Northern District of Illi-

nois rejected the argument that "in allowing section 113(h) to preclude the
present litigation, the court will allow this provision to override the requirements of the RCRA jurisdictional bar, rendering it ineffective."90 The court
reasoned that "[h]ad Congress intended to leave suits initiated under [RCRA's
imminent and substantial endangerment provision] untouched by section
113(h), it could have created an exception for such suits." 91 Without citing any
precedent on implied repeal, the court reversed the standard presumption, concluding that because Congress did not specify otherwise, it intended for the
newer statute to supplant the older one. 92
In Werlein v. United States, a District of Minnesota court noted that it "is
troubling" that "[b]y applying section [113(h)] to RCRA .. .the court is

frustrating, to a certain extent, the purpose[ ] underlying [that] statute" but
explained that "[i]t is clear that Congress intended that cleanups under section
88El Paso Natural
89245 F. Supp. 2d

Gas Co. v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 2d 111, 120 (D.D.C. 2012).
110, 114 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that Fifth Amendment Takings claim constitutes a "challenge" to an ongoing cleanup).
9 618 F. Supp. 2d 847, 852 (N.D. Ill.
2008).
91 Id. at 853.
92See infra Part I!.A (describing the presumption against implied repeal).
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[104] go forward unchallenged. 9 3 The court neither explained why "it [was]
clear" nor how it reconciled its conclusion with the precedent on inter-statutory
conflict resolution.
In United States v. Colorado,the Tenth Circuit gave the issue a more thorough treatment. 94 In that case, the State of Colorado brought suit in state court
to require the United States Army to comply with RCRA standards at a Colorado army base, at which the Army had begun CERCLA remediation. 95 Pursuant to a district court order in Colorado's favor, Colorado issued a RCRA
compliance order against the Army.96 The United States then brought suit,
seeking an injunction against enforcement of the compliance order, relying on
section 113(h). 97 The district court granted summary judgment for the United
States. 98 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit recognized the conflict between RCRA
and CERCLA and concluded that section 113(h) did not strip jurisdiction over
RCRA actions, noting that "to hold otherwise would require us to ignore the
plain language and structure of both RCRA and CERCLA, and to find that
CERCLA implicitly repealed RCRA's enforcement provisions contrary to Congress' expressed intention." 99 The court relied on two aspects of RCRA and
CERCLA. First, it relied on the CERCLA savings clause establishing that
nothing in CERCLA shall "affect or modify the obligations or liabilities of any
person under other" laws with respect to the release of hazardous substances' °
and on another "relationship with other laws" provision providing that
"[n]othing in [CERCLA] shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any
State from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to the
release of hazardous substances within such State."' 0 1 Second, the Tenth Circuit looked to RCRA, and observed that pursuant to its own preclusion provisions, enforcement actions could be "brought prior to the completion of the
CERCLA response action."' 0 2 The court noted that RCRA precluded endangerment suits while CERCLA response actions were underway and concluded
that by precluding one set of suits but not the other "Congress clearly intended
that a CERCLA response action would not prohibit a RCRA citizen enforcement suit."' 13

9 746 F. Supp. 887, 894 (D. Minn. 1990).
94 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993).
95 Id. at 1572. Technically, Colorado sued to enforce not RCRA standards directly but state standards enacted as part of a state RCRA-implementation program. Id. RCRA establishes a federal
floor for hazardous waste management standards, and where "EPA authorizes a state to carry out
the state hazardous waste program in lieu of RCRA, '[a]ny action taken by [the] State [has] the
same force and effect as action taken by the [EPA]."' Id. at 1569 (quoting RCRA § 3006; 42
U.S.C. § 6926(d) (2012)) (alterations in original).
96 Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1573.
97 Id. at 1573-74.
98
Id. at 1574.
99 Id. at 1575.

§ 302, 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (2012); see also infra notes 169-172 and accompanying
text (discussing this provision).
CERCLA
1OO

10142 U.S.C. § 9614(a).

101Colorado, 990
10
3 Id. at 1578.

F.2d at 1577.
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In contrast to Colorado, El Paso Natural Gas Company, River Village
West LLC, and Werlein, the vast majority of courts faced with overlap between
CERCLA section 113(h) and RCRA section 7002 have found no conflict at all.
In a few cases, courts, responding to arguments of inter-statutory conflict, have
recognized some overlap between the two provisions, but the facts of these
cases supported dismissal under both statutes, so these courts never addressed
the fact that the CERCLA provision is broader in scope - i.e., that there are
some circumstances in which CERCLA would point toward dismissal and
RCRA would not. 104 In effect, these courts have found no conflict between
CERCLA and RCRA because, on the facts before them, both statutes' preclusion provisions called for dismissal. 05
Courts have also universally distinguished and cabined Colorado, often
misconstruing its reasoning. In Arkansas Peace Center, the Eighth Circuit limited Colorado to cases involving state enforcement of RCRA.' ° But it did so
on the basis that the Tenth Circuit had relied on CERCLA's "relationship with
other laws" provision, which protects state law from preemption. Concluding
that that provision makes state enforcers special, the Eighth Circuit considered
Coloradoinapplicable. But the Eighth Circuit overlooked the fact that the "relationship with other laws" provision was only one of a number of factors that
the Colorado court considered relevant, and in particular that the Colorado
court had placed great emphasis on the impact that section 113(h) would have
on RCRA.
Specifically, the Colorado court distinguished the circumstances in that
case from previous cases in which courts held section 113(h) to have interstatutory effect not on the basis of the nature of the plaintiff, but because of the
nature of the cause of action at issue. First, the Tenth Circuit considered Schalk
v. Reilly, in which plaintiffs had alleged, among other things, that the cleanup
failed to satisfy CERCLA's own procedural requirements for public participation. The Tenth Circuit observed that the "plaintiffs in Schalk were attempting
to invoke the federal court's jurisdiction under CERCLA's citizen suit provision," but because of the phrasing of subsection (h)(4), the citizen suit excep"ISee Ark. Peace Ctr. v. Ark. Dep't of Pollution Control & Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1218 (8th
Cir. 1993) (finding that CERCLA action triggered both CERCLA section 113(h) and the RCRA

"actually engaging" provision); R.E. Goodson Constr. Co. v. Int'l Paper Co., No. C/A 4:02-4184RBH, 2005 WL 2614927, at *24-26 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 2005) (same); Reynolds v. Lujan, 785 F.
Supp. 152, 153-54 (D.N.M. 1992) (same, and also finding RCRA's "diligently proceeding" provision triggered); see also Clinton Cnty. Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1027 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997)
(relying on observation that RCRA's "actually engaging" provision and CERCLA section 113(h)
shared a common purpose to support application of section 113(h) to RCRA endangerment

action).

It is worth noting that even in all the cases cited in note 104, supra, there is a degree of
conflict: CERCLA renders the RCRA preclusion provisions meaningless. Indeed, in each of the
cases that applied both, the discussion of RCRA is dicta. Having first determined that section
113(h) stripped them of subject matter jurisdiction, these courts nevertheless proceeded to determine - needlessly - that RCRA would also have required dismissal.
" See, e.g., Ark. Peace Ctr., 999 F.2d at 1217-18 ("Tenth Circuit limited its holding to an action
brought by a state"); see also Shea Homes Ltd. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1204
(N.D. Cal. 2005) (same).
105
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tion, section 113(h) expressly bars such suits until after the remedial action is
complete. 107 By contrast, the exception has no such effect on non-CERCLA
citizen suits. 10
Second, the Tenth Circuit considered Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, in
which plaintiffs sought an injunction against a response action pending determination of the property's historic status. The case was inapplicable to the facts
of Colorado, according to the Tenth Circuit, not because of who the plaintiffs
were, but because of what they were asking for.1°9 A request to stay cleanup
"clearly constituted a challenge to the CERCLA remedial action," but an attempt to require compliance with RCRA's substantive requirements did not." 0
In sum, the existence of this conflict necessitates treating section 113(h)
differently when a plaintiff files suit under RCRA as opposed to CERCLA or
any other statute. RCRA is different from the numerous other statutes to which
CERCLA section 113(h) has been applied because it specifically contemplates
"the issue of whether such suits could be maintained in the face of a CERCLA
response.""' The earliest cases of inter-statutory application did not grapple
with this question.'2 And the cases following Colorado,focusing on the Colorado enforcer - the state - rather than the court's underlying reasoning,
glossed over the issue as well.' RCRA, which both provides for private rights
of action and contemplates how such actions will be limited by CERCLA activity, merits special treatment. The conflict must be resolved.
III.

A DOCTRINAL JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESERVING RCRA SUITS

Inter-statutory conflict should be avoided because it forces courts to
choose between different congressional enactments, elevating one Congress
above another. "Wherever possible," courts have said repeatedly, they are
"obligated to construe statutes harmoniously." ' 4 This doctrine provides little
guidance for determining whether or not a conflict exists but merely urges
courts to avoid it. Several commentators have noted, in the context of explori07
Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1577; see also infra notes 155-165 and accompanying text (discussing
this exemption).
"I Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1577.
109Id.

i10
Id.; see also Clinton Cnty. Comm'rs, 116 F.3d at 1027 n.5 (involving a request for injunction
and distinguishing Colorado in part on this basis).
1 Steams, supra note 51, at 71.
112Indeed, language in the early cases such as Boarheadand Schalk suggests these courts viewed
section 113(h) as intended to deal with the problem of recalcitrant polluters. In Boarhead, the
court explained "CERCLA's language shows that Congress concluded that disputes about who is
responsible for a hazardous site, what measures actually are necessary to clean-up the site and
remove the hazard or who is responsible for its costs should be dealt with after the site has been
cleaned up." Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1019 (3d Cir. 1991).
13Even the Tenth Circuit has cabined Colorado. See Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir.
2008) (applying section 113(h) to a RCRA suit).
114See Hammontree v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 925 F.2d 1486, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also
NoRmAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 2B SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 53:1 (7th ed. 2012) (describing the "principle of harmony in statute law" and citing
numerous sources).
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ing the presumption against implied repeal, that although the doctrine is intended to protect legislative supremacy, it is in the initial step of determining if
conflict exists that courts exercise considerable creativity. 115 What these doctrines do make clear, however, is that section 113(h) cannot be interpreted in
isolation. Courts must look beyond individual statutes at how statutes work
together. 116 Accordingly, where conflict is at issue, courts cannot "begin and

end with the language" of the provision to be interpreted."'
Having already determined that the potential conflict exists, this Article
now turns to the doctrinal tools for conflict resolution. The dominant theme in
conflict doctrine is that where it is possible to do so reasonably, courts should
try to harmonize two statutes and bypass the conflict. This is all the more true
where, as here, two statutes share an underlying purpose. This Part lays out a
path by which even the most textualist of courts might preserve RCRA citizen
8
suits.11 Failing to thoroughly examine this issue, most courts have missed this
alternate route and have assumed that they are following the only permissible
reading of CERCLA. This section posits that there is a second equally permissible, and arguably preferable, reading that eliminates any conflict between the
two statutes.
A.

The Doctrine of Implied Repeal

The doctrine of implied repeal demands that newer statutes be interpreted

in light of older statutes. As the Supreme Court has explained, where two statutes whose "literal terms appl[y] to the facts" and require different results,

"[s]ole reliance on the 'plain language' of [the more recent statute] would
assume the answer to the question at issue.""' 9 According to this reasoning, the
".See Note, supra note 85, at 1043 (arguing that the maxim glosses over the more interesting
question of "why [ ] a court find[s] irreconcilability and thus necessitate[s] repeal when it could
adopt a reconciliation which would enable it to leave both statutes in effect"); Karen Petroski,
Comment, Retheorizing the Presumption Against Implied Repeals, 92 CAL. L. REV. 487, 494
(2004) ("Yet the canons themselves offer no guidance for determining when a relationship of
contrariety exists between two statutes. Instead, courts determine the presence or absence of such
a relationship through descriptive demonstration, usually either a reconciliation of the two statutes
or an explanation of the reasons they cannot be reconciled. Such demonstrations are invariably
specific to the potential statutory conflict in question and necessarily involve considerable interpretive and rhetorical creativity. Thus, like the other canons of statutory construction debunked by
Llewellyn, the presumption against implied repeals and its corollaries allow courts to exercise
interpretive freedom while signaling interpretive restraint.").
"6 Kristen M. Fletcher, Compromising the Cleanup or Compromising to Cleanup? RCRA Suits
Allowed Under CERCLA § 113, 21 J. LEGIS. 351, 352 (1995) (observing that although CERCLA
language appears to be clear, courts must take account of how statutes are "meant to work together, and not against one another").
"' Cannon, 538 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 360 F.3d 188, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2004))
(explaining that because the language of section 113(h) was clear the court had no reason to look
at the legislative history).
118This Article accepts textualism as the current dominant frame for statutory interpretation and
argues primarily within that framework. It turns to other modes of statutory interpretation only
where textualism fails to provide a definitive answer.
"9 Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981).
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"plain language" approach the majority of courts have taken to CERCLA is
flawed, regardless of whether it is the best reading of CERCLA in isolation,
because of the conflict it creates with RCRA -

even if courts are ultimately

correct to give CERCLA precedence, reading that statute in isolation is a

mistake. 120
Implied repeal is strongly disfavored. 21 The Supreme Court has noted that
absent a "clear and manifest" intent to repeal the older of the two statutes, the
courts should "read the statutes to give effect to each if they can do so while
preserving their sense and purpose." 122 Two policy concerns drive this doctrine: deference to the legislature and maintenance of a stable and predictable
legal system. 123 The former concern is driven in part by the assumption that if
to both
the legislature intended repeal, it would say So. 1 2 4 By giving effect
25
statutes, courts can avoid exercising their own policy preferences.
The next question, then, is whether section 113(h) demonstrates Congress's "manifest intent" to partially repeal RCRA section 7002. In Boarhead,
the Third Circuit found intent to repeal, but, given that the other statute at issue
was the National Historic Preservation Act, a statute without its own private
right of action or its own preclusion provision and thus a statute with which
subsection (h) has no conflict, it is unclear exactly what the Third Circuit found
that Congress had intended to repeal. 26 The case is accordingly not on point.
In Colorado, on the other hand, the Tenth Circuit looked at RCRA in particular
and found no manifest intent for repeal. 27 In fact, the Colorado court distinguished Boarhead on the basis that "application of [section 113(h)] to the facts
120 Steams, supra note 51, at 72 ("Because RCRA's citizen suit provision does address this issue,
it is an indication that Congress did not intend CERCLA section 113(h) to bar a RCRA citizen suit
when RCRA's provisions specifically allow parties to bring suits in the face of CERCLA cleanups. To hold that CERCLA section 113(h) bars RCRA citizen suits would be to find that Congress meant to implicitly repeal a right of action conferred by RCRA.").
121 Petroski, supra note 115, at 489 (expressing concern that doctrine could go too far, noting that
its strongest form, the presumption amounts to a sort of clear-statement rule - allowing for
"[i]n
repeal only by express provision - that negates the very notion of an implied repeal").
122 Watt, 451 U.S. at 267 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also SINGER & SINGER, supra
note 85, § 23:9 (explaining that courts avoid implied repeal where possible by "giv[ing] effect to
both, unless the text or legislative history of the later statute shows that Congress intended to
repeal the earlier one and simply failed to do so expressly").
123Jesse W. Markham, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Implied Repeal Doctrine: Expanding Judicial Power to Rewrite Legislation Under the Ballooning Conception of "Plain Repugnancy", 45
GONZ. L. REv. 437 (2009-10). The two values behind the implied repeal doctrine are judicial
deference to the legislature and "maintenance of a legal framework that is predictable, stable, and
administrable." Id. at 471.
124See Note, supra note 85, at 1039-40 (explaining that this assumption is faulty because the
legislature often has no knowledge of the earlier enactment); Petroski, supra note 115, at 491
(arguing that intentionalism pervades the presumption against implied repeals).
125See Markham, supra note 123, at 457 (arguing that the doctrine of implied repeal "gives almost
equal weight to the newer and older statutes" and finding no a priori reason for the rule). But see
Note, supra note 85, at 1039-40 (asserting that the rule disfavoring implied repeal is exercised "to
avoid repeal which is deemed undesirable for extrinsic policy reasons .... Otherwise, the presumption against implied repeals means only that the court in equipoise will decide against
repeal").
126 Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991).
127United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993).
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of that case did not 'affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities' of
a responsible party 'under other Federal or State law . . . with respect to releases of hazardous substances' .... 128 Even if Boarhead had been looking at

RCRA, it based its finding of intent on the state law carve-out provision, which
is, at best, tentative evidence of intent to repeal RCRA's preclusion
provisions.'29
At core, the search for "manifest intent" is no different from the search for
plain meaning: Does CERCLA section 113(h)'s language expressly apply to
RCRA suits? Accordingly, the remainder of this Subpart returns to the plain
language of CERCLA.
Numerous scholars have combed CERCLA's text and legislative history,
attempting to determine whether Congress in fact intended for section 113(h) to
have such broad application.130 Every court considering section 113(h) has
agreed that it has at least some inter-statutory application. But neither CERCLA's text nor its legislative history provides a definitive answer for the proper
scope of the provision. This Part will take a fresh look at the provision and its
statutory context. Read as a whole, the statute provides several powerful arguments for a broad reading. But it also provides several strong arguments for a
narrower reading. Ultimately, CERCLA itself provides no definitive answer.
This Subpart begins with the subsection's lead clause: this language appears at
first glance to support the broad reading, but it contains a fundamental pragmatic ambiguity. Next, this Subpart turns to the remainder of the subsection
and to the rest of section 113. In this statutory context, the ambiguity grows
deeper. Finally, this Subpart looks to CERCLA's two savings clauses and considers the possibility that CERCLA's savings clauses limit section 113(h)'s inter-statutory application to statutes other than RCRA.
1.

"No Federal court shall have jurisdiction"

The subsection's lead clause is extremely broad. It states that "No Federal
court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law ...

to review any challenges to

removal or remedial action selected under [CERCLA section 104], or to re-

128Id. at 1577 (quoting CERCLA § 302(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (2012)) (first ellipsis in original).
But see Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of Wash., 66 F.3d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The temporary bar
to citizen enforcement does not change the [defendant's] 'obligations or liabilities' under the
CWA or RCRA.").
129See infra notes 152-154 and accompanying text (explaining why the state law carve-out is
ambiguous evidence of Congress's intent vis-a-vis other federal law).
130See,

e.g., Healy, supra note 47, at 289-91 (describing the legislative history of section 113(h));

Karla A. Raettig, When Plain Language May Not Be Plain: Whether CERCLA's Preclusion of
Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review Is Limited to Actions Under CERCLA, 26 Ei'rvTrL. L. 1049
(1996) (concluding that Congress prioritized preventing delay over preventing irreparable harm);
Jonathan N. Reiter, Comment, CERCLA Section 113(h) & RCRA Suits: To Bar or Not To Bar?, 17
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 207, 210-17 (1998-99) (exploring language and legislative history
and concluding that language is vague because members of Congress disagreed as to its scope);
Steams, supra note 51, at 72 (concluding that Congress did not specifically consider the impact of
section 113(h) on RCRA suits).
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view any order issued under [CERCLA section 106]."' 31 Looking at the provision, the Third Circuit observed that "Congress could hardly have chosen
clearer language to express its intent generally to deprive the district court of
jurisdiction over claims based on other statutes when the EPA undertakes the
clean-up of toxic wastes at a Superfund site."' 3 2 Indeed, the language refers not
to actions brought under CERCLA but to "any challenges to removal or remedial action."'33 Numerous courts have therefore concluded that the provision
effects a "blunt withdrawal" of federal jurisdiction. 134
On its face, the language limits neither the type of action nor the plaintiff
to which it applies. It also does not limit the defendant to which it applies.

Section 113(h) has been invoked by both government agencies and by polluters
to stave off citizen suits.
2.

"to review challenges to... selected" response actions

So what does it mean to "challenge" a selected response action? Could it
be that "challenge" limits the type of cause of action, or the relevant plaintiff,
or the relevant defendant? What is a challenge?' 35 It is essential to consider

this question in order to preserve the distinction, made by the Tenth Circuit in
United States v. Colorado, between barring courts from reviewing response
actions and barring courts from reviewing challenges to response actions. 3 6

There is a difference between a suit that requires a court to review the response
action in the course of asking a different question - such as whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages as a result of the response action'37

-

and one that

directly attacks the response action itself - such as in a suit to enjoin incineration. 3 s In other words, an action arguing for a different cleanup plan than one
131CERCLA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2012). More on the contents of that ellipsis later.
132

Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1020.

13342 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (emphasis added).
134 See, e.g., Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1333 (10th Cir. 2008); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Work-

ers Int'l Union v. Richardson, 214 F.3d 1379, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 2000); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1995); N. Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239,
1244 (1991).
135On a lighter note, I have a copy of the 4th edition of Black's Law Dictionary sitting in my
office, and not quite realizing how old it was, started my search there. Its primary definition for
challenge was "a request by one person to another to fight a duel." This definition does not
appear in the current 9th edition.
136 990 F.2d 1565, 1575 (10th Cir. 1993) (using the concept of the challenge as a hook to preserve
RCRA suits and thus avoid having to find a repeal by implication).
13 Beck v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 62 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
"[a]lthough determination of whether [defendant's cleanup was] 'wrongful' may require examination of the EPA's orders, resolution of the damage claim would not involve altering the terms of
the cleanup order" (internal citation and footnote omitted)).
131Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that suit seeking to enjoin a
selected mechanism for cleanup constituted a challenge because it would delay implementation of
the cleanup plan); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 81 (1985), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N
2835, 2836 (explaining that "there is no right of judicial review of the Administrator's selection
and implementation of response actions until after the response action have [sic] been
completed").
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already selected would constitute a challenge. 139 The Colorado court distin-

guished between a suit seeking an injunction against cleanup, which would
certainly be a challenge, and a suit seeking that cleanup comply with RCRA's
substantive requirements, which would not be a challenge, but the court did not
determine where exactly the line between those two things would fall.'

°

The Ninth Circuit has taken an even broader view of "challenge," concluding that any action "directly related to the goals of the cleanup itself'
could constitute a "challenge."' 141 Under this approach, a suit seeking to improve the cleanup is a challenge, even if it would not result in delay; accordingly, requiring compliance with RCRA's substantive requirements would
constitute a challenge.

42

Several other courts have adopted this standard.

43

Under any of this precedent, however, a suit to compel cleanup where it
had stalled would likely be considered a "challenge" because it would "interfere with the remediation process ongoing at the site."' 44 It would undermine
what many courts have referred to as EPA's discretion to choose not just the

45
mechanism but also the timing of cleanup.
But nothing in the "challenge" clause itself provides guidance as to the
appropriate scope of the word. Black's defines "challenge" as "[a]n act or
instance of formally questioning the legality or legal qualifications of a person,
action, or thing."' 146 This definition suggests that the only direct attacks on
remedy selection are those involving arguments that the remedy is legally inad47
equate (because it does not meet or exceeds statutory requirements). Most

courts, however, have read "challenge" more colloquially, asking, as described

above, whether the suit would interfere with the ongoing response action and
not whether the suit was attacking the legal sufficiency of the response action.

A suit to jumpstart a stalled cleanup process, particularly in the absence of
an agency decision to halt work or to do no work, 148 is only a challenge in that
' Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1097 (observing that "judicial review itself slows the process down" because "'judicial review of agency clean-up activities would hinder and delay the hazardous waste
disposal"' (quoting Jefferson Cnty. v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 18, 182 (E.D. Mo. 1986))).
'~o

Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1576-77.

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 330 (9th Cir. 1995) (contrasting
a suit seeking compliance with RCRA, which is directly related to the CERCLA cleanup action,
with a suit seeking to enforce a minimum wage requirement for cleanup workers, which would not
be barred).
'42 Id. By contrast, a suit that did not seek to alter the terms of the cleanup may not constitute
a
challenge. See Beck, 62 F.3d at 1243 (holding that claim seeking damages for harm caused by
diversion of water as a result of cleanup order was not a challenge to the cleanup plan).
'43 See, e.g., Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 674-75 (8th Cir.
1998) (considering
whether complaint sought to "interfere with the remediation process ongoing at the site ... [or
was] directly related to the goals of cleanup itself' and concluding that false claims act suit was
not barred (internal quotation marks omitted)).
'4 Id. at 675.
145 See, e.g., Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1336 (10th Cir. 2008) (expressing sympathy
with
the plaintiffs "frustration with the long delays").
W4
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
14'This definition may also limit the bar to suits brought against the enforcing government agency
as opposed to suits brought against the polluter.
14 See N. Penn Water Auth. v. Bae Systems, No. 04-4446 2005 WL 1715718, at *8 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 16, 2005) (relying on fact that the EPA had specifically considered and rejected a remedy
'4'
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colloquial sense; it does not attack the legal sufficiency of the selected remedy.
that section 113(h) does not bar "any challenge"
The D.C. Circuit has observed
"without qualification."1 49 Rather, it bars challenges to "particular action[s] or
order[s]."' 150 This alternate reading of "challenge" casts doubt on the certainty
with which most courts have read the provision to apply not only to all causes
of action but also to all plaintiffs. "Challenge" is, indeed, the fuzziest word in
subsection (h)'s lead clause, and it is this word that provides a legitimate entry
5
point for reading the subsection more narrowly.1 1
3.

"other than under section 1132"

Perhaps the best argument in favor of inter-statutory application of section
113(h) lies in the ellipsis in the version of the provision quoted above. In that
ellipsis is an exception for one entire category of non-CERCLA suits - state
law causes of action brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Unabridged, the lead clause of the provision reads: "No federal court shall have
jurisdiction under Federal law other than under section 1332 of Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction) .... 52 The Third Circuit has
hinted that it is this carve out that indicates that the provision extends to all
other causes of action that "challenge" selected response actions. 53 In other
words, because Congress created an exception for state law causes of action but
not for any other non-CERCLA causes of action, it intended for the provision
to bar the latter category of suits.
But the Third Circuit failed to consider the central function of that carve
out, which is to protect state law nuisance actions. 5 4 The provision can be read
as a mechanism to ensure relevant state law would not be preempted, a concern
that does not exist in the context of suits brought under other federal law. This
additional federalism concern undermines the strength of the carve-out as evidence of section 113(h)'s application to other federal law causes of action.
4.

"except one of the following"

The rest of subsection (h) casts further doubt on the arguments put forth
above for finding inter-statutory application. Regardless of how broad or how
clear section 113(h)'s jurisdiction-stripping language appears when read in isolation, the remainder of subsection (h), the remainder of section 113, and the

that plaintiffs sought as a basis to conclude that suit to order that remedy was a challenge to the
selected response action).
49
Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 360 F.3d 188, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
50

Id.

1

See infra Part IV.C (undertaking this narrower reading).
§ 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2012) (emphasis added).

' '

152CERCLA

MSee Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 10 11, 1020 n.14 (3d Cir. 1991).

See H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 224 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3317 (sug-

'14

gesting the carve out was to preserve state nuisance actions).
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remainder of CERCLA are relevant to its plain meaning.'55 Read in this context, the scope of the jurisdiction-stripping language is even less clear.
First, subsection (h) contains five exceptions, each allowing particular
CERCLA actions to proceed. 5 6 The provision does not bar CERCLA cost recovery actions, actions brought by the government to enforce CERCLA orders,
CERCLA reimbursement actions, actions by the United States to compel CERCLA remediation, and, importantly, CERCLA citizen suits. The citizen suit
exemption allows CERCLA citizen suits to proceed, despite the jurisdictional
bar, once CERCLA cleanup is complete and no remedial action is "yet to be
undertaken."' 57 It is this provision that courts turn to when considering whether
RCRA citizen suits may proceed. For instance, in Cannon, the court observed
that section 113(h) bars RCRA suits that challenge a remedial plan only until
that "plan has been completed."'5 s The exemption, however, is limited on its
face to citizen suits brought pursuant to the CERCLA citizen suit provision. 5 9
Section 113(h) contains no parallel exception for citizen suits brought under
any other federal law. Paying no mind to the fact that the exceptions are directed only to suits arising under CERCLA, many courts have simply assumed
that the same completeness rule applies to other types of citizen suits. But

nothing in the provision supports this assumption.
One possible explanation for why the exceptions address only CERCLA
suits is that other types of citizen suits simply do not fall within the ambit of the
bar in the first instance. Indeed, a court presuming otherwise - that nonCERCLA citizen suits are barred - has two unenviable choices. Either it can
follow the lead of the Cannon court and read the CERCLA citizen suit exception to apply to all types of citizen suits, despite the exception's clear language.
Or it can conclude that non-CERCLA citizen suits are barred indefinitely, re-

gardless of whether the CERCLA action at the site is complete. 6° This latter
option would contravene the well-established presumption in favor of judicial
review.' 6' Although the legislative history is not particularly definitive with

"' See King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (explaining the cardinal rule that "a
statute is to be read as a whole, [because] the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context" (internal citation omitted)).
15642 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(l)-(5).
157See, e.g., Clinton Cnty. Comm'rs v. EPA, 116 F.3d 1018, 1022-25 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc).
158Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1332 (10th Cir. 2008) (asserting that section 113(h) "does not
preclude actions to challenge a remedial plan after that plan has been completed").
159
Although most courts have ignored this point, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Colorado,
relied on the fact that section 113(h)(4) did not apply when it found that the State of Colorado was
not barred from bringing a RCRA enforcement action despite ongoing CERCLA activity. 990
F.2d 1565, 1577 (10th Cir. 1993). Had Colorado instead needed to rely on CERCLA's citizen suit
provision, the express language of the exception, barring suit where remedial action "is to be
undertaken," would have barred the suit. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4).
160A third possibility is that a court could read a completion requirement into the word "challenge." If a response action is complete, an action is not a challenge to it. Of course, this reading
would render subsection (h)(4) surplusage and would be difficult to apply where the primary
allegation of the post-cleanup action was that the selected response action was insufficient to
address the problem. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613.
161See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) ("[J]udicial review of a final agency
action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that
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regard to the precise scope of the bar, it is nearly universal in referring to section 113(h) as a bar on "pre-enforcement review."' 62 Given this characterization of the provision as a limitation on "timing of review,"'

63

it would be

incongruous to conclude that Congress intended to permanently withdraw the
jurisdiction of federal courts to hear a wide variety of claims whenever those
claims happened to involve a site subject to CERCLA cleanup.
Many courts have, nevertheless, relied on the citizen suit exception to jus-

tify inter-statutory application of subsection (h). For instance, in McClellan
Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "[i]f
the prohibitory language did not include citizen suits, there would have been
little need for the exception in subsection (h) for citizen suits challenging past

cleanup actions."' 64 The Ninth Circuit overlooked the fact that plaintiff had
filed a RCRA suit, not a CERCLA citizen suit, and thus it never grappled with
the fate of non-CERCLA citizen suits in light of the narrow nature of subsec-

tion (h)(4).
Next, the remainder of section 113 provides further support for holding
that only CERCLA actions are "challenges." Titled "Civil proceedings," the

provision governs a variety of procedural issues related to actions brought
under CERCLA's various sections, including section 107 cost recovery actions,

section 104 and 106 enforcement actions, and section 310 citizen suits. Only
one of section 113's twelve subsections has any bearing on any action brought
under any statute other than CERCLA. That one is subsection (i), which provides that "[i]n any action commenced under this chapter or under [RCRA] in
a court of the United States, any person may intervene as a matter of right

such was the purpose of Congress."). Nevertheless, one court has adopted this position. In Frey
v. EPA, the Southern District of Indiana rejected a RCRA claim despite the fact that remediation
was complete. No. 1:00-CV-660-RLY-WTL, 2006 WL 2849715 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 2006). The
court reasoned that because section 113(h) provides no exceptions for non-CERCLA claims,
CERCLA provides an exclusive remedy for challenging a cleanup. Id. at *3. Indeed, an older
Seventh Circuit case suggested this very conclusion, explaining that the "method of section
113(h) is not to toll judicial remedies, and leave it at that; it is to specify the remedies that survive.
Once the remedial action has been completed, a suit either to enjoin the action or to compel it is
moot, and the statute does not authorize either form of suit." N. Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d
1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1991) (speculating that section 113(h) may permanently extinguish certain
causes of action). The Seventh Circuit also observed that because of the possibility of foreclosing
judicial review despite arbitrary agency action, the "breadth of section 113(h) is troublesome."
Id. On the ground that the case at issue was squarely within its confines and raised no constitutional concerns, the Seventh Circuit left "for another day the exploration of the outer bounds of
this unusual provision." Id.
162 The legislative history's characterization of section of section 113(h) as a bar on "pre-enforcement review" of cleanup orders suggests that Congress envisioned "challenge" to mean something more direct than "related to the goals" of cleanup. See S. REP. No. 99-11, at 58 (1985). The
phrase "pre-enforcement review" suggests that it is only the recipient of the order that can "challenge" it. Any other plaintiff, i.e., anyone other than the party against whom the order could be
enforced, must, by definition, be seeking something other than pre-enforcement review.
163 "Timing of review" is also, of course, the title of the subsection. CERCLA
§ 113(h), 42
U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2012).
1- 47 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1995).
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when" certain conditions are met. 165 That subsection (i) expressly extends its
scope to RCRA actions while subsection (h) does not is telling.
In the context of the remainder of section 113, then, subsection (h)'s lead
clause becomes less "blunt." In fact, either reading of the clause - that it had
inter-statutory application or that it did not - would be reasonable.
5.

The Savings Clauses

To further confuse matters, CERCLA contains two different savings
clauses. One supports inter-statutory application of section 113(h). The other
supports protecting RCRA from that inter-statutory application.
The first is a subsection of CERCLA's citizen suit provision. It reads:
"This chapter does not affect or otherwise impair the rights of any person under
Federal, State, or common law, except with respect to the timing of review as
provided in section [113(h)] of this title .... ,1166 Although this savings clause
has been invoked by litigants to argue in favor of inter-statutory application of
section 113(h), no court has ever used it to support such application. 67 Instead,
courts rely on it to support the proposition that CERCLA is not meant to preempt local and state environmental laws,'68 suggesting that the timing of review
provision does in fact alter the rights of persons under other federal laws, possibly including the right of citizens to file suit under RCRA.
By contrast, CERCLA's other savings clause provides that "[n]othing in
[CERCLA] shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of
any person under other Federal or State law, including common law, with respect to releases of hazardous substances or other pollutants or contaminants."' 69 In Colorado, the Tenth Circuit relied on this language when it
allowed the State of Colorado to proceed with a RCRA enforcement action. 170
As mentioned above, it also relied on this language to distinguish Boarhead,
which found intent to repeal.' 1 Applying subsection (h) in the facts of Colo172
rado would have resulted in altering the defendant's obligation under RCRA.
The Colorado court dealt with the case of an enforcement action. Colorado was attempting to enforce particular RCRA requirements.'
But the
court's conclusion would carry equal weight in the context of an endangerment
action. Application of section 113(h) to RCRA would modify the "obligation"
of polluters to abate
"imminent and substantial endangerment to health [and]
174
the environment."'
16542

U.S.C. § 9613(i).
§ 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(h) (2012).
67Anacostia Riverkeeper v. Washington Gas Light Co., No. 11-1453 (RMC), 2012 WL 4336243,
(D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2012).
168See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, Cal., 302 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
16942 U.S.C. § 9652(d).
17o United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1575-76 (10th Cir. 1993).
m See supra note 87 and accompanying text (explaining how Colorado distinguishes Boarhead).
172Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1576.
" Solid Waste Disposal Act §82, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(A) (2012).
14 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).
166 CERCLA
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Together, these savings clauses may be read to justify inter-statutory application of section 113(h) to all statutes except those creating "obligations or
liabilities" related to "releases of hazardous substances." But one court has
taken a different approach. In Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of Washington, the

Ninth Circuit concluded that because section 113(h) was only a temporary bar
on RCRA suits it did not change obligations and liabilities under RCRA. 17"
Further, the Ninth Circuit concluded that allowing the savings clause to limit
17 6
the scope of section 113(h) in this manner would swallow section 113(h).
The Ninth Circuit overlooked that this narrowing would preserve only other
statutes related to release of hazardous substances; thus much of the section's
inter-statutory application would remain unaffected. But the Ninth Circuit's
emphasis on subsection (h)'s temporal nature highlights some ambiguities in
the provision. Are a firm's obligations and liabilities altered if they kick in later
than they otherwise might have? Or is subsection (h) a limitation only on citizens' right to enforce the firm's obligations and not an alteration of those obligations directly? Again, the savings clauses provide no definitive answer to the
question of the scope of subsection (h).
6.

Conclusions

In sum, there are three possible readings of section 113(h). First, as most
courts have concluded, it might apply to all causes of action that may interfere
with ongoing CERCLA remediation. Second, it may apply to some narrower
subset of non-CERCLA causes of action. Or, third, it may apply only to causes
of action arising under CERCLA. The legislative history sheds no further light
on the matter. And for good reason, members of Congress themselves did not
agree on the provision's meaning.' Beyond the statements of individual members, however, nothing in any of the committee reports addresses the question
of application of section 113(h) to RCRA suits in particular.' Ultimately, the
statute offers no clear answer. 7 9
This suggests two doctrinal conclusions. First, despite the conclusion of
most courts, the meaning of section 113(h) is not so plain. There are multiple
plausible readings. Second, because there are multiple plausible readings, not
7566 F.3d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1995).

Id.
Reiter, supra note 130, at 216-17 (noting contradictory statements within the legislative history
as to whether the bar applied to RCRA suits or not and whether it applied to all plaintiffs or just
polluters).
"ISee H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 222-25 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3315-18
(describing addition of section 113(h) and making no mention of RCRA); H.R. REP. No. 99-253,
pt. 1, at 79-83 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861-65 (discussing amendment to
section 113 and making no mention of RCRA); H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 21-24 (1985),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3044-47; H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 5, at 24-27 (1985),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3147-50.
' Healy, supra note 47, at 316 (observing that "section 113(h) and the legislative history
show[ ] that Congress did not consider the complexities of the statutory interactions that would
arise in these cases and, thus, did not intentionally select its preferred means for resolving statutory inconsistencies that might arise").
176
177
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all of which conflict with RCRA, there is no manifest intent to repeal any part
of RCRA.

A few additional points bear mentioning. First, treating RCRA differently
than other statutes makes sense because, as explained in Part I above, RCRA
and CERCLA together form a comprehensive statutory scheme governing toxic

waste.180 The two statutes are designed to work together and function in many

ways as a single statutory scheme.'
Several years after passing RCRA, Congress enacted CERCLA "in response to increasing concern over inactive or
abandoned sites that contain hazardous wastes or other hazardous substances.
Earlier legislation had not effectively dealt with inactive sites."182 CERCLA
was thus "designed to address many of the same toxic waste problems that
inspired the passage of RCRA" and to fill RCRA's gap 83 by establishing a
scheme of retroactive strict liability for polluters.' s4 Because the two statutes
are so closely related, they shed light on each other's meaning.185
Second, because Congress added section 113(h) to CERCLA just two
years after it revisited and amended RCRA's citizen suit and preclusion provisions" 6 and because the two statutes are so closely linked, the usual contention
that finding implied repeal may be appropriate because Congress could not
have been expected to think through all the implications of its new enactment
holds less weight. In other words, critics of the canon argue that courts should
not presume that Congress would have said something had it intended repeal.
In this case, Congress very well should have said something had it intended
repeal.
Io See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (describing the two statutes); Steams, supra note
51, at 54-55 (describing the close relationship between the two statutes).
181See Steams, supra note 51, at 54 (exploring legislative history of both statutes).
182Lone Pine Steering Committee v. EPA, 600 F. Supp. 1487, 1495 (D. N.J. 1985); see also
United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1570 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that RCRA "was 'clearly
inadequate' to deal with 'the inactive hazardous waste site problem""' (quoting H.R. RaP. No.
1016, pt. 1, at 17-18 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119 at 6120)).
113
Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996); see also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha,
958 F.2d 1192, 1202 (2d Cir. 1992) ("RCRA is preventative; CERCLA is curative.").
' CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
185 RCRA and CERCLA are in pari materia. Cf Consolidated Cos., Inc. v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
2006 WL 408234 at *13 (W.D. La. 2006) (finding the two statutes were in pari materia with
regard to the definitions of their terms). In Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., one district
court compared the two statutes and determined that because "RCRA regulates disposal activities,
whereas CERCLA concerns itself with liability for cleaning up hazardous substances which have
already been disposed and which have now been released or are threatened to be released into the
environment," the two statutes are not in pari materia. 632 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033-34 (E.D.
Wash. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be sure, this is an accurate description of the
two statutes, but it overlooks the common underlying purpose of the two schemes. It is also
inapplicable, at least, to the endangerment provision, which does "concern[) itself with liability
for cleaning up hazardous substances which have already been disposed .. " Id. See also
SINGER & SINGER, supra note 114, § 51:3 (defining and explaining the significance of in pari
materia).
" Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 113, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)) (amending CERCLA to include section
113(h)); The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 401, 98
Stat. 3221 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B)) (amending the citizen suit
provision of RCRA to include endangerment suits and preclusion provisions).
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Finally, Congress did, in fact, say something regarding the impact of the
CERCLA amendments on RCRA. At the same time that Congress added section 113(h), it amended CERCLA's "Relationship to Other Law" section,
which addresses the impact of CERCLA on RCRA provisions relating to recycled oil.'87 But it made no mention in this section of the impact of section
113(h) on RCRA citizen suits, suggesting either that Congress knew that the
provision would not affect RCRA's endangerment suit preclusion provisions, or
that Congress simply did not consider the question. Either way, this omission
in the "Relationship to Other Law" section further supports the conclusion that
Congress did not intend any repeal. 8'
In the absence of any intent, the presumption against implied repeal requires that both statutes be given effect to the extent that doing so would not
undermine the purpose of either. 18 9 Reading section 113(h) narrowly so as not
to apply to RCRA endangerment actions would "preserv[e] the[ ] sense and
purpose" of both statutes. 19 Because, as many courts have recognized, the
purpose of section 113(h) was to prevent litigants from delaying CERCLA
cleanup processes, declining to apply the provision in the context of RCRA
suits to abate "imminent and substantial endangerment" would not run contrary
to this purpose.' 9' Further, RCRA itself ensures that the RCRA endangerment

suit will not cause the type of delay that subsection (h) is concerned with.
RCRA bars suit where CERCLA cleanup is actually proceeding; thus, it prevents polluters from seeking to delay cleanup.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c) (explaining impact of CERCLA amendments on RCRA provisions
addressing recycled oil); see H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 225-28 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3318-21 (describing amendments to CERCLA's "Relationship to Other
Law" provision).
"' See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) ("[It can be strongly presumed that
Congress will specifically address language on the statute books that it wishes to change.").
189See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (observing that "[riedundancies
across statutes are not unusual events in drafting, and so long as there is no positive repugnancy
between two laws, a court must give effect to both" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1575 (1993) (relying on "the plain language and
structure of both CERCLA and RCRA" to determine the scope of section 113(h)).
190Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981). Another way of thinking about this is to conceive of
section 113(h) as a bar on pre-enforcement review. Whether such a bar is appropriate depends,
first, on whether it furthers the goal of the statute and allows for effective agency operations, and,
second, on whether it is fair, which turns on whether it will be too late later to raise the issue.
Healy, supra note 47, at 292-94 (summarizing the factors courts consider when determining
whether pre-enforcement review is appropriate in a given statutory context). Where pre-enforcement review would actually contravene the statutory scheme, the provision should be read more
narrowly.
191Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Richardson, 214 F.3d 1379, 1382 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (observing that the rationale behind section 113(h) was "'that pre-enforcement review
would be a significant obstacle to the implementation of response actions and the use of administrative orders"') (quoting S. REP. No. 99-11, at 58 (1985)); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1,
at 266 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2941 (stating that "[t]he purpose of [this]
amendment is to prevent private responsible parties from filing dilatory, interim lawsuits which
have the effect of slowing down or preventing EPA's cleanup activities"). One commentator has
suggested that repeal by implication would contravene the purpose of both statutes. Steams,
supra note 53, at 83 (observing that finding intent for implied repeal would be inconsistent with
the purposes of RCRA and CERCLA - to avoid cleanup of hazardous contamination).
187
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Can They Be Harmonized?

Case after case reiterates the same point. If the court can harmonize the
two statutes, it should. 92 Harmonization is only a viable option if it is reasonable. In other words, a court can only avoid conflict if it can do so without
butchering the language of the statute in question. Colorado offers one route: It
explained that a RCRA enforcement action "was not a 'challenge' to [a] CERCLA response action. To hold otherwise would require us to ignore the plain
language and structure of both CERCLA and RCRA, and to find that CERCLA
implicitly repealed RCRA's enforcement provisions contrary to Congress's expressed intent."' 93 "Challenge," the most flexible word in section 113(h), provides courts an opportunity to read that section in a manner narrow enough to
prevent it from creating conflict with RCRA.
With regard to endangerment, this harmonization is very straightforward.
Simply put, a suit is only a challenge to a selected cleanup plan where that plan
is ongoing. If it is not ongoing, then the challenge is to the delay, not to the
selected remedial or removal action. 94 This approach tracks the CERCLA preclusion to the RCRA preclusion: If a removal or remedial action is ongoing, the
suit would be barred under RCRA anyway. For instance, if EPA is actively
conducting an RI/FS, suit would be precluded by RCRA section
7002(b)(2)(B)(ii), which prevents suit where EPA is "actually engaging in a
removal action."' 95 If EPA has completed the RI/FS, however, but has not yet
commenced any remedial action, even though it has announced intent to do so,
suit would not be barred under RCRA. Under the current case law, CERCLA
would bar a suit under this circumstance, but, following the reading of "challenge" put forth here, a suit would not constitute a challenge because there
would be no ongoing action to challenge. Essentially, if substantial time lapses
between stages of cleanup, between Time Two and Time Three (per figure 2,
above), the response actions would be constructively complete. Until EPA or
another relevant government agency restarted its efforts, citizen groups would
be free to bring suit under RCRA's endangerment provision. 96
" SINGER & SINGER, supra note 114, § 51:2 ("Courts try to construe apparently conflicting statutes on the same subject harmoniously, and, if possible, give effect to every provision in both.").
'9' United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1575 (10th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
"9One court has rejected this distinction. In Hanford Downwinders Coal., Inc. v. Dowdle, plaintiffs raised the policy concern that the agency could "indefinitely avoid judicial review by never
taking action." 841 F. Supp. 1050, 1061-62 (E.D. Wash. 1993). The court rejected plaintiffs
contention that section 113(h) should bar only suits against misfeasance and not suits against nonfeasance, explaining that the distinction was foreclosed by the plain language of section 113(h).
Id. The court explained that "CERCLA gives the agencies charged with its implementation substantial discretion to select not only the substance of their response actions but also the timing of
those actions." Id. But the court failed to consider the possibility that agencies often do not make
decisions about timing; rather, projects get derailed for other reasons.
' RCRA § 7002(b)(2)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012); supra note 9 (an RI/FS is a
removal action).
"9One difficult practical question this raises is how much delay is enough. If EPA completes an
RI/FS and waits a few months before commencing a remedial action, is that enough? Probably
not, but in practice, it is likely to make little difference. If a citizen group thought it saw true
delay - i.e., a situation where EPA had shifted priorities or where negotiations had stalled - and
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Enforcement actions are more complicated. Following Colorado, RCRA

enforcement actions, which seek merely to have an ongoing cleanup comply
with RCRA's substantive requirements, are not "challenges" because, although
they relate to the goals of cleanup, they do not directly interfere with cleanup.
But to bring enforcement seeking injunctions against cleanup suits outside the

section 113(h) bar requires the more drastic conclusion that section 113(h) has

no extra-statutory application at all. 197 Such a narrow reading would also preserve NEPA and NHPA suits and constitutional challenges and other challenges

that don't contain their own internal limits (as RCRA does). Such a narrow
reading could easily undermine the section's fundamental purpose of allowing
for expeditious cleanup because it would allow polluters to use other citizen
suits to stall cleanup. But adopting the middle path described in Part III.A.6,
above, would then preserve only some RCRA suits.

Accordingly, one more canon of statutory interpretation bears mentioning.
For the RCRA enforcement action, seeking to enjoin a selected response or
remedial action, conflict is unavoidable. In this situation, the general rule is
that the newer rule defeats the older rule, but there is one exception to that: The
more specific statute trumps the more general statute, even where the latter is
newer. 198 Here, RCRA is far more specific. CERCLA section 113(h) broadly
governs the scope of federal jurisdiction over challenges to CERCLA actions
- stripping jurisdiction, regardless of the nature of the CERCLA activity or

the underlying cause of action in the suit. RCRA, by contrast, addresses preclusion in the much more specific context of RCRA citizen suits and takes a
much more nuanced approach.' 9 This canon, like those aimed at avoiding conflict in the first instance, operates on the principle that the courts ought not to
substitute their own judgment for that of Congress. Where Congress has addressed a narrow question in a comprehensive way it cannot be presumed to be
tossing that scheme aside when it later addresses a broader question in a general way.
brought suit too early, EPA could bar the suit by recommencing cleanup activities. Although most
courts have read the RCRA preclusion provisions to require that the cleanup was ongoing at the
time of filing in order to bar suit, there is no reason that the CERCLA provision must be read in
that way as well. As soon as cleanup recommences, the suit would become a challenge to that
selected response action.
'1 Unlike endangerment suits seeking injunction against ongoing cleanup, which would be barred
under RCRA as well, enforcement suits seeking injunction could likely proceed under RCRA.
See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text (describing RCRA's preclusion provisions).
' See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974) ("Where there is no clear intention
otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the
priority of enactment."); SINGER & SINGER, supra note 114, § 51:5 ("Where one statute deals with
a subject in general terms and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed
way, the two should be harmonized if possible. But if two statutes conflict, the general statute
must yield to the specific statute involving the same subject, regardless of whether it was passed
prior to the general statute, unless the legislature intended to make the general act
controlling ... ").
I" Steams, supra note 51, at 72 ( "Because RCRA's citizen suit provision does address this issue,
it is an indication that Congress did not intend CERCLA section 113(h) to bar a RCRA citizen suit
when RCRA's provisions specifically allow parties to bring suits in the face of CERCLA
cleanups.").
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Another way to think about this is that the RCRA preclusion provisions
are a comprehensive and carefully constructed statutory scheme for ensuring
that RCRA citizen suits in particular do not interfere with or delay CERCLA
cleanup activities. In a number of cases, courts have prevented polluters from
using abstention doctrine to make an "end run" around that scheme.2°° In response to arguments that federal courts should abstain from RCRA suits out of
deference for state administrative actions, courts have concluded that because
the RCRA preclusion provision creates a comprehensive scheme governing
when suits can proceed, application of Colorado River abstention doctrine,
which would carve out an additional category of suits that cannot proceed,
would be inappropriate. Likewise, allowing polluters to rely on the broad preemption of section 113(h) would allow them to make an "end run" around
RCRA's carefully crafted preemption provisions. It would be ironic to let polluters use section 113(h) to hide from RCRA enforcement.2 0'
In sum, a careful reading of CERCLA reveals a viable alternative to the
path taken by most courts. This alternative preserves the language of both statutes in most cases. So why have so few courts opted for this alternative? The
next Part explores that question and offers several possible explanations, considers the limitations of those explanations, and then offers several reasons to
opt for a narrower reading of section 113(h).
IV.

LET CITIZENS BACK INTO COURT

The broad reading of section 113(h) threatens not just the public health but
also the very function of courts as facilitators of citizen attorneys general. Although courts have raised some legitimate concerns about allowing these cases
to proceed, these concerns are primarily self-serving. They protect the courts at
the expense of Congress, the Executive, and the general public.
A.

Why Broaden the Bar? Policy Justifications and Their Limitations

The previous section lays out a course for statutory interpretation that
would allow courts to preserve RCRA suits without violating the principles of
textualism. Why have so few courts opted for this alternative? Although no
court has laid out these options and explained its choice among them, many
2

" See, e.g., PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
abstention in favor of a state administrative proceeding "would be an end run around RCRA.

Congress has specified the conditions under which the pendency of other proceedings bars suit
under RCRA and. . . those conditions have not been satisfied here") (emphasis in original). See
also Chico Serv. Station, Inc. v. Sol Puerto Rico Ltd., 633 F.3d 20, 30-32, n.14 (1st Cir. 2011)

(citing many other cases rejecting abstention arguments). But see Coal. for Health Concern v.
LWD, Inc., 60 F.3d 1188, 1193 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding abstention appropriate when "the exercise
of federal review at this juncture would be disruptive of [state] efforts to establish a coherent

volicy").

'See infra Part IV.C (describing how section 113(h) shields polluters from RCRA compliance).

2013]

Pollans,A "Blunt Withdrawal"?

have offered some insight into why they may be so quick to foreclose judicial
review.
First, as noted above, many courts have considered suits that would be
barred under both statutes and thus have not been forced to grapple with actual
conflict. Broadly-drafted opinions coming out of these suits have then been
treated as precedential in later cases that do involve conflict. This has been true
even when an earlier case expressly limited its own scope or speculated that
other types of cases may necessitate limiting the bounds of section 113(h). For
instance, in the early case Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, in which the Third
Circuit barred a National Historic Preservation Act claim, and on which many
later courts have relied to support section 113(h)'s inter-statutory application,
the court expressly limited the scope of the holding. 0 It explained that EPA
regulations demonstrate that "EPA properly construes the [National Historic
Preservation Act] to require it to consider the historic preservation concerns
[the plaintiff] asserts before it takes action pursuant to CERCLA," so, because
the plaintiff had "not demonstrated" that EPA "cannot or will not abide by" its
own regulations, "we do not need to reach the troubling questions of whether
judicial review would be available if [the plaintiff] could show that [EPA]
failed to comply with [its own regulations.]"'2 3 No later court has returned to
that "troubling question." In addition, unlike many subsequent cases,
Boarhead involved a plaintiff who was also the liable party. Although the suit
was styled as a citizen suit under NHPA, it was, at core, an attempt by the liable
party to stall cleanup. Barring suit was therefore consistent with section
11 3(h)'s purpose. Many later courts have followed Boarhead despite this difference and without regard to Boarhead's limiting language.
Second, toxic site cleanups are highly technical. Although the primary
policy justification described in the legislative history is to avoid delay, many
courts have cited an additional consideration: deference to agency expertise.
Hesitant to second guess EPA determinations as to what level of cleanup is
appropriate, courts have repeatedly asserted that they should not interfere with
EPA administration of the statute. In rejecting a NEPA claim and a RCRA
claim, a Northern District of Illinois court explained that in addition to facilitating prompt cleanup, the purpose of section 113(h) was to "give some deference
to the judgment of the USEPA, which [Congress] created to protect the public
interest in enforcing federal environmental laws."2°4 More recently, the same
court was even more direct: "the district court has neither the special resources
nor the special expertise necessary to properly address or understand the myriad of scientific and policy issues presented by an alleged imminent and sub2

923 F.2d 1011, 1022 n.17 (3d Cir. 1991).
Id.
4N.Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 753 F. Supp. 1413, 1418 (N.D. Ill.
1990), affld930 F.2d 1239 (7th
Cir. 1991). See also New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1249 (10th Cir. 2006) (declining to "substitute a federal court's judgment for the authorized judgment of... the EPA");
Hanford Downwinders Coal., Inc. v. Dowdle, 841 F. Supp. 1050, 1061 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (noting
that "CERCLA gives the agencies charged with its implementation substantial discretion to select
not only the substance of their response actions but also the timing of those actions").
203

2
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stantial endangerment to health or the environment."2 05 Reasoning that it is
EPA and not the court that "has specifically been charged with the responsibility to develop and enforce regulations to implement the environmental laws
passed by Congress," the court justified its conclusion that plaintiff's imminent
and substantial endangerment claim was a challenge to an administrative consent order °6 Of course, Congress envisioned EPA to be the primary enforcer,
but the function of citizen suit provisions is to allow citizens, with the help of
courts, to be secondary enforcers where EPA has, for whatever reason, failed. 07
Although in insulating agency action from review Congress undoubtedly
intended to allow EPA a degree of freedom in administering the statute, freedom of administration was not an end in and of itself. Instead, it was a means
to facilitate speedy and efficient cleanup. The nearly complete freedom of administration that courts have given EPA facilitates an additional end: it allows
EPA to engage in delay itself, precisely the function citizen suits aim to avoid.
In addition, by broadening the categories of barred suits, courts put pressure on
agencies to engage in expensive enforcement. Where EPA's resources are limited, it may welcome the opportunity to allow citizens to step in as private
enforcers, as it does every time a citizen group files a notice of intent to sue,
and the agency chooses not to bar the suit by taking its own action. 08
It is important to distinguish between an agency decision to take no action
and agency inaction. Typically, courts cannot review agency inaction at all.2°9
But here, the statutory scheme contemplates judicial review precisely where the
agency has not acted. In such cases, a citizen can step in and sue the polluter
directly without stepping on EPA's toes. This is true even if EPA (or another
relevant enforcement agency) has taken some preliminary action but has
stopped work. By contrast, where EPA has made an express "no action" determination, a court should perhaps be more hesitant to step in.
A third possible explanation is that courts are concerned with administrability of the statutory scheme. Beyond the concern about the technical expertise necessary to craft and oversee implementation of a remedy, the
proposed reading of section 1 13(h) puts an additional burden on courts. Rather
than apply a bright line rule, this reading asks that courts treat different types of
suits involving sites with CERCLA cleanup differently.210 For example, a suit
205River Vill. W. LLC v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 618 F. Supp. 2d 847, 855 (N.D. I11.

2008).
206 Id. at 854-55.
207See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text (describing the value of citizen suits).
200EPA also retains the option to intervene in citizen suits whenever it likes. Perhaps courts might
adopt the assumption that where, in a suit against a private polluter, EPA does not choose to
intervene, EPA is happy to defer to court-facilitated citizen enforcement.
209See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 706(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2012) (allowing challenge
to agency inaction only where the agency has a discrete nondiscretionary duty to act).
210 In Werlein v. United States, the District of Minnesota was explicit about this concern. Superseding an earlier order in which the court had concluded that section 113(h) did not apply to
RCRA suits, the court determined that the provision applied to RCRA as well as several other
statutes. 746 F. Supp. 887, 892 n.4 (D. Minn. 1990) (vacated in part, on other grounds, 793 F.
Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992)). The court explained that in the previous order, it "approached section [113(h)] as merely the CERCLA codification of the common law doctrine of primary juris-
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under NHPA or NEPA would still be barred, while a suit under RCRA could
proceed if cleanup were stalled. Of course, a bright line rule is simpler, but,
given the countervailing considerations described in the following pages, it undermines not only congressional intent, but also the public interest.
B.

Protecting the Public Interest

Where Congress has made no express determination to favor other values

over those discussed above, and the relevant expert agency has not chimed in, it
is left to courts to weigh the policy implications of its interpretive choices.
Inter-statutory application of section 113(h) to RCRA reduces the scope of cir-

cumstances under which private citizens can enforce RCRA. This result is normatively undesirable. In addition to increasing the risks of toxic harms and
undermining the purpose of RCRA, inter-statutory application of section 113(h)

to RCRA in particular reduces government accountability and can result in
delayed and less effective cleanup.
1.

IrreparableHarm

The literature on section 113(h) has focused primarily on one problem it
creates: irreparable harm. As the Ninth Circuit has recognized, "[s]ection
113(h) may in some cases delay judicial review for years, if not permanently,

and may result in irreparable harm to other important interests." ''

Numerous

scholars have considered this problem and have used it as a basis to argue for

judicial and legislative reform.2" 2 Irreparable harm arises both in the context of

RCRA enforcement actions - in which plaintiffs argue that cleanup methods
such as incineration violate RCRA's substantive guidelines for handling and
disposal of toxic waste" 3 - and in RCRA endangerment actions - in which
plaintiffs argue that the method of cleanup will create an imminent and substandiction." Id. Faced with a new motion involving other claims, the court changed course, treated
section 113(h) as "a statutory bar to subject matter jurisdiction," and concluded that it had "only
two principled choices . . . : (1) rule that section [113(h)] applies only to CERCLA itself, and
allow plaintiffs' injunctive claims ... ; or (2) rule that section [113(h)] bars all challenges to the
ongoing cleanup under federal or state law." Id. If "only CERCLA and RCRA [were] involved," the court admitted, "[it] probably would have let plaintiffs' RCRA injunctive claims go
forward." Id.
211 McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 329 (9th Cir. 1995).
212 Healy, supra note 47, at 339-41 (explaining that serious fairness concerns arise where section
113(h) is read to bar suits in which plaintiffs allege that the selected cleanup itself will cause
irreparable harm); Milos Jekic, Note, Lowering the JurisdictionalBar: A Call For an EquitableFactorsAnalysis Under CERCLA's Timing-of-Review Provision, 59 KAN. L. REv. 157, 186-87
(2010) (calling for a test balancing the nature of alleged harm with duration of response and
economic impacts of precluding review); Raettig, supra note 130, at 1050 (noting that for plaintiffs alleging violations of the Clean Water Act or RCRA, post-cleanup review may be too late);
Reiter, supra note 130, at 225 (arguing that courts should carve out an exception where plaintiffs
could proceed if they could establish a likelihood of irreparable harm); Stearns, supra note 5 1, at
50 (arguing that the provision should not bar suits alleging irreparable harm).
23 See, e.g., Ark. Peace Ctr. v. Ark. Dept. of Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212,
1217-18 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding no jurisdiction over claim that cleanup plan violated RCRA's
substantive standards).
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tial endangerment to health and the environment. 2 4 But only the former type of
harm stems from inter-statutory conflict. An Eighth Circuit case, Arkansas
Peace Center v. Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology, illus-

trates this point. Plaintiffs sought an injunction against a planned incineration
of waste from herbicide and pesticide production, arguing that the incineration
both violated a specific RCRA requirement, governing emissions of dioxins,
and that the resulting emission of dioxins constituted an imminent and substantial endangerment.2" 5 Examining the enforcement claim, the court found it was
a challenge to a removal action and thus was precluded by section 113(h).216
Turning to the endangerment claim, the Eighth Circuit rested its conclusion that
the suit was barred on RCRA itself."1 7 In particular, the court relied on the
provision precluding citizen endangerment actions when the state or EPA is
"actually engaging" in a CERCLA removal action.21 8 But the endangerment
action would also have been barred under section 113(h) itself. Where cleanup
- a removal or remedial action - causes imminent and substantial endangerment there still may be risk of irreparable harm, but there is no inter-statutory
conflict because the outcome would be the same under either statute.
Arkansas Peace Center itself demonstrates that the risk of irreparable
harm in the enforcement suit context is nonetheless serious. The very purpose
of RCRA's substantive provision is to prevent harm; if section 113(h) forces
private citizens to wait until after the harm has occurred to enforce those provisions there is also the chance that some degree of the harm will be irreparable.
2.

Government Accountability

In shielding both the government and polluters from allegations of RCRA
non-compliance, section 113(h) undermines the very function of RCRA - to
reduce future risk to human health and the environment - and government
accountability for that function. RCRA's substantive requirements governing
the handling, transportation, storage, and disposal of toxic waste are prospective. In other words, they are designed to stop further pollution before it starts.
CERCLA specifically requires that these standards be met during CERCLA

cleanups.21 9 In McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, the Ninth

Circuit noted the possibility that section 113(h) might shield RCRA non-compliance, but concluded that "[w]hatever the theoretical potential for an evasion
of RCRA in other cases, it does not exist here" because the site cleanup plan

See, e.g., id. at 1218 (finding no jurisdiction over claim that cleanup created an imminent
endangerment).
25
1d. at 1213-15.
216
Id. at 1218. RCRA itself bars enforcement actions only when the government is "diligently
prosecuting" its own action. RCRA § 7002(b)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B) (2012); see
supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing RCRA enforcement suit preclusion provisions).
"'Ark. Peace Cr., 999 F.2d at 1218.
218Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)(ii), (b)(2)(C)(ii)); see also supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (describing RCRA endangerment suit preclusion provisions).
24

9See supra note 16 and accompanying text (describing role of RCRA in CERCLA cleanup).
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"incorporates the requirements of all relevant hazardous waste legislation. '220
But the court did not engage with the more fundamental problem: purely post
hoc citizen enforcement of RCRA requirements cannot foster government accountability. If the function of RCRA is to ensure that toxics are handled properly the first time around, citizen enforcement cannot enhance this purpose if it
can only occur after initial cleanup is complete.
3.

Delayed Cleanup

Although the purpose of section 113(h) is to prevent delay, the majority
rule exacerbates it. For instance, in Cannon v. Gates, plaintiffs were barred
from bringing suit despite the fact that the polluter (in this case the United
States Army) had polluted the site during World War II, begun its initial investigation of the site in the 1970s, and had still not commenced an actual cleanup
in 2008.221 The obvious cost related to endangerment suits is that endangerment to health and the environment may continue unabated. This is a serious
consideration. Congress added the endangerment provision as an invitation for
citizens to help police toxic pollution. Any limitation to the scope of the provision reduces the effectiveness of that policing. Allowing endangerment to continue unabated can result in enormous cost in the form of medical costs, loss of
life, loss of consortium, ecosystem damage, etc. For instance, if EPA undertook
a study pursuant to CERCLA, selected a remedy, but never took any steps to
implement that remedy, section 113(h) would bar the suit, and the harm would
continue unabated. Typically, EPA does not simply abandon cleanup projects it
has begun, but it can succumb to substantial delay, resulting from insufficient
resources or difficulty cooperating with other federal or state agencies involved
222
at a site.
Delay can be harmful not only to human health and the environment but
also to firms concerned about the scope of their liability. Although a firm may
prefer to spend money on cleanup later, it may also prefer to have the scope of
its liability resolved as soon as possible. This motivation may, at least partially,
explain why polluters sought pre-enforcement review prior to SARA - to de2 23
termine the scope of liability up front.
Citizen endangerment suits might bypass this delay, forcing immediate
determinations of the scope of cleanup required and the scope of polluter liability, thereby both protecting health and the environment and protecting the polluters' financial solvency by securing certainty.

220 47 F.3d 325, 329 (9th Cir. 1995).
221 538

F.3d 1328, 1336 (10th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging the delay problem).

222See Gordon C. Rausser, Leo K. Simon, & Jinhua Zhao, InformationAsymmetries, Uncertain-

ties, and Cleanup Delays at Superfund Sites, 35 J. ENvTt. ECON. & MNGMT. 48, 48-49 (1998)
(explaining that information asymmetry between the polluter and the enforcement agency can
prolong the investigation period and delay cleanup); Sigman, supra note 82, at 317 (describing
various causes of delay).
223 Cf Healy, supra note 47, at 300-01 (describing these suits and mentioning other possible
motivations such as reducing the scope of liability).
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Less Effective and Efficient Cleanup

For the polluter concerned less with certainty of costs and more with minimizing costs in the long run, expanded preclusion creates a perverse incentive
for the polluter to seek out enforcement from a government entity it knows is
short on resources and therefore less likely to pursue enforcement vigorously.22 4
In this circumstance, minimal enforcement effort by that government entity
would preclude citizen enforcement and prevent adequate cleanup. In a more
extreme circumstance, a polluter may seek out a slow regulator in order to give
the polluter time to hide assets. By the time the regulator brings a cost recovery
action or attempts to order cleanup, the polluter would be judgment-proof. In
either circumstance, keeping the ready-and-willing enforcer out of court results
in delayed cleanup that is more costly to taxpayers.
Similarly, preclusion of endangerment suits can be costly both to the environment and to taxpayers where a government agency has commenced cleanup
and is engaged in negotiations with the polluter but because of either the polluter, or the government, or both, negotiations are stalled. Under these conditions a citizen suit may be exactly what is required to move cleanup forward. A
citizen suit might put pressure on a recalcitrant polluter to be more cooperative
in a consent decree negotiation. Or the suit may give the polluter incentive to
put pressure on the government to move forward.
The suit could serve as a catalyst for successful negotiations. In addition,
the suit would pose little risk of undermining the outcome of the negotiations
because, although a consent decree reached after a suit is commenced would
not bar suit under RCRA (which applies only where the consent decree is
reached prior to the commencement of suit), it is likely that the polluter will
225
successfully be able to get the case dismissed on mootness grounds.
Barring citizen suits under these circumstances puts a burden on the public
fisc. The citizen suits under these circumstances can save taxpayer dollars in
two ways: first, if a government entity is short on resources, it can allocate
them elsewhere, despite having taken initial steps to require cleanup at this site,
comforted with the promise that cleanup would still proceed as a result of citizen enforcement. Second, it can reduce government enforcement costs by saving the government the cost of bringing an enforcement action where a polluter
is resistant to compromising on a consent decree.

et al., supra note 222, at 49 (explaining that polluters may benefit from delay because
of the discount rate).
225See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Am. Recovery Co., 769 F.2d 207, 207 (4th Cir. 1985)
(holding that a citizen suit filed prior to a government enforcement action should not be dismissed
on statutory preclusion grounds once the government enforcement action is filed but that, in that
case, the government enforcement action made the suit effectively moot); Md. Waste Coal. v.
SCM Corp., 616 F. Supp. 1474, 1483 (D.C. Md. 1985) (applying mootness doctrine to determine
whether portion of plaintiffs' Clean Air Act suit could proceed after EPA took enforcement
action).
224 Rausser,
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C.

The Polluter Beneficiary

Ultimately, the primary beneficiary of expanding the scope of RCRA preclusion is the polluter, and not just because it is protected from successive prosecution. It is also insulated from enforcement where the relevant government
agency has begun a cleanup process but then shifted priorities to other projects.
In that situation, section 113(h) may protect it from needing to expend resources on cleanup at all (or at least in the near future).12 6 Of course, it could be
in a particular case that this is an efficient savings, that the cost of enforcement
and cleanup would exceed the benefits of cleanup. But it could also be that the
benefits outweigh the costs. Unless courts are going to engage in this costbenefit analysis and bar suit only where it is efficient to do so, the better default
rule is to allow suits to proceed and assume cleanup will result in net gain,
rather than to bar suit and assume it will result in costs.2 27 And, as explained
above, the RCRA citizen suit provision was intended to increase RCRA compliance. 228 Thus, the former default rule is better aligned with RCRA's purpose.
Polluters may also argue that allowing citizen suits to proceed under these
circumstances threatens government prosecutorial discretion. 229 But it is precisely the purpose of the citizen suit provisions to allow citizens to step in and
fill the void where the government simply has insufficient resources to prosecute. Because RCRA suits are against polluters, and require polluters to expend resources on cleanup, they do not detract from the government's
discretion to choose to delay a particular cleanup in favor of allocating resources elsewhere. The exception to this is, of course, where the government is
the polluter. Indeed, where the government is the polluter, citizen suits seeking
cleanup do indeed reduce government discretion with regard to allocation of
resources. But this is exactly what citizen suits are supposed to do: to ensure
that the executive branch does not have the discretion to choose not to comply
with congressionally established environmental mandates. 30

226 Of course, as discussed above, this circumstance could also be costly for a firm that knows it

will have to pay eventually and would prefer to have the dollar amount settled sooner rather than
later.
227 This is a version of the precautionary principle: in the face of scientific uncertainty, it may be
desirable to take preventative protective measures. See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Who's Afraid of
the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 21, 79 (2005) (The "precautionary principle
does not answer the question of how precautionary regulatory policy should be, but it can serve as
an important reminder that regulatory policy should seek to prevent harm before it occurs, and that
it should reject the insistence of regulatory targets that a never-ending quest for improved information should indefinitely postpone sensible regulatory measures."); but see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 15 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2003) (criticizing the
precautionary principle on the ground that it provides no real guidance to regulators).
228 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
229 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (suggesting that how broadly courts interpret environmental statutory preclusion provisions depends on how much deference courts want to give to
state
and federal prosecutorial discretion).
23
1 See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text (discussing the value of citizen suits).
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CONCLUSION

Reading section 113(h) to expand the scope of suits barred under RCRA
and thus to reduce the universe of suits authorized under RCRA imposes numerous costs on the environment and on taxpayers. The purpose of section
113(h) was to ensure expeditious cleanup, but reading it to apply to RCRA suits
can often do just the opposite. The majority rule creates a costly conflict
between RCRA and CERCLA. And the majority of courts have failed to give
this conflict thorough airing; instead, courts have developed a rule that inappropriately reduces the role of courts in toxic site cleanup.

